CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE
ON DISARMAMENT

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FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-EIGHTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Thursday, 14 August 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. J.F. LEONARD (United States)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. O. SARACHO
Brazil:	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
	Mr. M. DARCY de OLIVEIRA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. R.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. J. CINGROS
Ethiopia:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. I. SARKADI
	Mr. J. PETRAN
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Japan:	Mr. K. ASAKAI
	Mr. Y. NAKAYAMA
	Mr. M. OGISO
	Mr. Y. KAWAKITA
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. R. VALERO
Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. Z. ERENDOO
Morocco:	Mr. A.T. BENHIMA
	Mr. A. CHERKAOUI
	Mr. A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. BOS
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. A. SHAHI
	Mr. K. AHMED
Poland:	Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO

Romania:	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
	Mr. A. SASU
	Mr. C. MITRAN
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. I. VIRGIN
	Mr. R. BOMAN
	Mr. U. ERICSSON
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
	Mr. V.V. SHOUSTOV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. H. KHALLAF
	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
	Mr. M.E. HOWELL
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
	Mr. R. McCORMACK
Yugoslavia:	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (United States): I declare open the 428th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. HUSAIN (India): In continuation of the preliminary views expressed by my delegation at our meeting on 17 April (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 65 et seq.) regarding the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed, I wish today to speak more specifically about the draft treaties placed before us by the delegations of the Soviet Union (ENDC/240) and the United States (ENDC/249). While doing so I should like, however, to reiterate the conviction of my delegation that, in keeping with the main task of this Committee to conclude a treaty on general and complete disarmament under effective international control, the priority in our negotiations should be given to measures aimed at halting the nuclear arms race and at the achievement of nuclear disarmament, and that the guiding consideration in all our efforts should be actual disarmament and not merely non-armament.

3. While prior to 23 May we discussed at some length the Soviet draft treaty on the sea-bed, now, in the resumed session since 3 July, we have been discussing also the United States draft treaty. My delegation has heard with close attention the views expressed by various delegations about the three principal issues involved: namely the nature of the prohibition, the limits beyond which the prohibition should apply, and the question of verification to ensure compliance with the provisions of the treaty. There are several other issues, of which some have been referred to in the United States draft treaty, some have been mentioned in the Soviet draft treaty, and some have been raised by other delegations.

4. My delegation agrees with the view expressed by some delegations that issues relating to consequential provisions can be gone into after agreement has been reached on the three basic issues, without a serious consideration of which it is not possible to proceed with an examination of the detailed provisions of the treaty. I shall therefore refrain at this stage from expressing views about those other matters.

5. On the fundamental question of the nature of the prohibition to be incorporated in the treaty, we have in the drafts before us two widely-differing views. In the United States draft the prohibition is confined to "nuclear weapons or other weapons of mass destruction or associated fixed launching platforms" (article I); but the Soviet draft goes much further and prohibits also the setting up or the maintenance of "military bases, structures, installations, fortifications and other objects of a military nature" (article 1).

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6. Each side has criticized the other either for going too far or for not going far enough. It is interesting to observe that for sustaining those two widely-differing viewpoints both sides have relied on the same criteria to arrive at different conclusions. The United States, for example, maintains that the prohibition should be restricted to nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction so as to "reduce the verification problem to manageable proportions" (ENDC/PV.414, para. 6), and that if we were to

> "... try to prohibit the placing in the sea-bed and ocean floor of all 'objects of a military nature', we would raise problems of verification which would be insuperable..." (ENDC/PV.411, para. 23).

Increasing peaceful activity, commercial, scientific and other research, it is added, necessitate less onerous and frequent verification than would be required by the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed.

7. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is of the view that if we were to limit the prohibition to weapons of mass destruction the verification problem would become more complicated. The Soviet Union has added:

> "Indeed, if the ban covered only certain types of activity, the controlling party would be faced in each specific case with the question of whether the object concerned had to do with prohibited or permitted activities." (ENDC/PV.400, para. 23)

8. The second argument advanced by the United States against total demilitarization is that it would be a threat to the security of States, as under a total ban systems of detection and surveillance of submarine traffic would be prohibited as constituting military use even though such systems were essential purely for self-defence. Furthermore, the United States representative has stated:

> "... some non-nuclear but very clearly military uses of the sea-bed are strictly defensive, are presently essential to our security and that of others and therefore must not be subject to treaty prohibitions." (ENDC/PV.421, para. 36)

9. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, maintains that the security of States demands a total ban because tracking systems for self-defence against submarines can be set up within the twelve-mile zone, and those required to be established beyond that zone cannot be for self-defence. As regards defensive weapons, it is the view of the Soviet delegation that -

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"... the difference between defensive and offensive weapons is very relative, and that so-called defensive weapons can also be used for offensive purposes." (ENDC/PV.409, para. 25)

10. The third argument advanced by the United States is that the main or major threat to the peaceful use of the sea-bed is from nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and that therefore in the task of preventing an extension of the arms race to the sea-bed other types of military activities need not be considered, because -

"It is our belief ... that realistic possibilities do not now and will not soon exist for conventional military uses of the sea-bed that would be threatening to the territories of States. Nor do we believe that there are non-nuclear military uses of the sea-bed that could in the next few years trigger an arms race." (ENDC/PV.421, para. 35)

11. The Soviet Union, on the other hand, is of the view that limiting the prohibition to nuclear weapons would "open the way for the unleashing of a conventional arms race" and "constitute a kind of legalization of military activities by States in this area so far as conventional arms are concerned." (ENDC/PV.400, para. 14). The Soviet representative has further stated:

"... we do not see any grounds for limiting the problem of prohibiting military activities on the sea-bed to prohibition of the emplacement on the sea-bed and the ocean floor only of such weapons as could be used for striking against the territories of States. We believe that weapons which may be designed to strike at ships and to disrupt sea communications with a view to interrupting economic and trade relations between States represent no less a danger to peace and world security. We must consider the question of prohibiting the emplacement of both nuclear and conventional weapons on the sea-bed in its entirety without trying to introduce any artificial limitations." (ENDC/PV.423, para. 45)

12. My delegation, after hearing these arguments and counter-arguments to sustain the differing views about the nature of the prohibition on which the treaty is to be based, feels that these differences seem in fact to arise, apart from the fear of commercial espionage, principally from the different naval-warfare strategies of the sponsors of the two drafts before us. While it is true that in the present stage of technological development in the use of the sea-bed it is only these two Powers which are most

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concerned with economic exploitation and the arms race on the sea-bed, it must be acknowledged that what we are dealing with is a treaty of universal applicability and of unlimited duration. This means that while we should, of course, take serious cognizance of the preoccupations of these two Powers, we should also take into account the requirements of other maritime Powers which in the years to come will make large technological advances in the use of the sea-bed, as well as the security requirements of the vast majority of the countries of the world.

13. Our clear objective in regard to such a treaty is, as laid down by United Nations General Assembly resolution 2467 (XXIII), that the sea-bed beyond the limits of present national jurisdiction should be reserved exclusively for peaceful purposes, and that the exploitation of its resources "should be carried out for the benefit of mankind as a whole, ... taking into account the special interests and needs of the developing countries". Taking these factors into consideration, my delegation has come to the conclusion that, while the prohibition defined in article I of the United States draft is the barest minimum which must anyhow be included in the treaty, we feel, sharing the view of a number of other delegations so well explained by the Canadian delegation in its statement at our meeting on 31 July (ENDC/PV.424, paras. 18 et seq.) that the treaty should not limit its prohibition to weapons of mass destruction only but should, in principle, extend to all weapons, and to military bases and fortifications and to other installations and structures of a military nature which could be used against the territory, the territorial sea or air space of the coastal States or against the peaceful activities of coastal States in the exercise of their national jurisdiction.

14. The prohibition would not, however, cover means of communication and navigation, devices capable of detecting the approach to the shores of ships or submarines, and other defence measures deemed necessary. The basic principle, in the view of my delegation, should be the essential security interests of coastal States and particularly the security needs of non-nuclear-weapon States with long coastal lines difficult to defend. It is a cardinal principle of our negotiations in this Committee that all measures of disarmament should be balanced so that security is ensured equally for all States (ENDC/5).

15. As regards the area to be covered by the prohibition contained in the treaty, it is generally agreed that it should be as large as possible; but views differ as to what constitutes "as large as possible". We have the Soviet proposal that it should consist

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of the area beyond a horizontal distance of twelve miles from the coast while the United States has suggested a distance of three miles. We have also the Japanese suggestion that, if the prohibition is to concern itself with only nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, the distance should be zero miles (ENDC/PV.420, para. 14); and the Canadian suggestion that there should be a defensive zone of 200 miles (ENDC/PV.424, para. 23). Then there is the Swedish suggestion for seeking a compromise between three miles and twelve miles by providing for the nine miles in between these two limits a type of prohibition different from that applicable beyond twelve miles (ENDC/PV.422, paras. 46 et seq.).

16. It is the considered view of the Indian delegation that, taking every aspect of the matter into consideration -- particularly the need to have as large an area as possible covered by the treaty and, equally, the need not to infringe unduly the existing sovereign rights of coastal States -- a twelve-mile limit would be the most appropriate and also likely to be more generally acceptable than any other limitation of distance smaller or larger than twelve miles.

17. In favour of three miles it has been said that three instead of twelve miles would add two million square miles to the area from which the nuclear arms race would be eliminated (ENDC/PV.414, para. 10). This line of argument is difficult to appreciate because, considering the nature of delivery vehicles which carry nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction, a distance of nine miles would not make any material difference. Furthermore, a reduction of the distance from twelve miles to three miles would create more problems than it would solve. While thirty-one States have a territorial sea limit of three miles, seventy-three States have a territorial sea limit of more than three miles, and the bulk of those seventy-three States have a limit of twelve miles.

18. For a large number of States, then, difficulties would arise in regard to their security, and also problems relating to verification and control under the treaty. It is difficult to envisage States with a territorial sea limit of twelve miles agreeing to accept restrictions upon their sovereignty in the outer nine-mile region of their territorial sea, or to allow the carrying out of observation and inspection procedures on this part of their territorial sea. In this respect we agree with the view expressed by the Soviet delegation that -

> "Since many States possess a twelve-mile zone of territorial waters, if a narrower coastal sea zone were established for the purposes of the treaty

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it would be necessary to obtain the permission of the coastal State for foreign ships to enter those waters or for foreign aircraft to fly over that zone for purposes of control. That could, of course, give rise to difficulties for the unhindered exercise of control ..." (ENDC/PV.423, para. 55)

19. In favour of three miles it has also been said that such an arrangement would avoid questions relating to -

"... the status of the zone that would exist between a twelve-mile limit, for example, and the outer limits of territorial waters that were less than twelve miles." (ENDC/PV.414, para. 10)

My delegation finds it difficult to understand this view, since for a coastal State which claimed only three miles as its territorial waters the zone of nine miles beyond its national sovereignty would have a status no different from the status it has at present. If it is apprehended, as was pointed out by the representative of Canada at our meeting on 13 May (ENDC/PV.410, para. 7), that this intermediate nine-mile zone could be open to unrestricted military activity by any State, and not only to the coastal State, then a provision could be introduced in the treaty to safeguard against such a contingency. Furthermore, if by adopting a three-mile limit it is intended to avoid for thirty-one States the question of the status of the intermediate zone, it would raise even more varied and difficult problems relating to verification for no less than sixty-five States whose territorial sea claims vary between four miles and twelve miles.

20. There are two other aspects of the delimitation of the area of prohibition under the treaty on which, we believe, there is fortunately by now general agreement. First, whatever horizontal distance from the coast might be agreed upon for the zone excluded from the prohibition under the treaty, it would be specifically and entirely for the purposes of this treaty and would not in any way prejudice or interfere with existing national jurisdiction or rights and claims pertaining to the territorial sea or the contiguous zone or the continental shelf. This has not been stated in the Soviet draft but has been provided for in article II(3) of the United States draft. A clear provision in this regard would seem to be necessary. Second, as regards the manner in which the distance in question is to be measured, practically all delegations share the view that it should be measured from the same baselines as are provided for

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in the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone.[1] This has been mentioned in article 3 of the Soviet draft and is acceptable to the United States delegation subject to agreement being reached "on the appropriate interpretations" (ENDC/PV.414, para. 11). We hope that agreement will soon be reached on those interpretations.

21. As regards the third related question of verification of the prohibition, the relevant provisions contained in the two drafts before us vary both in their intent and in their scope. The Soviet draft is based on the concept of reciprocity and access, and the United States draft is based on the concept of observation, consultation and co-operation. The first question that arises is: who has the right to verify compliance with the provisions of the treaty? As a result of lengthy discussions here it is now generally agreed that the concept of reciprocity in the sense of bilateral arrangements does not represent a reasonable or acceptable basis for verification, and that this right should be available to all parties to the treaty without discrimination. This is not provided for in the Soviet draft but is implied in the United States draft. It is the view of my delegation that it would be necessary to state this in clear terms in the treaty.

22. The next question concerns the manner in which this right of verification is to be exercised. Clearly, mere observation, consultation and co-operation are not enough, as these three ideas contain no definite commitment to verify the observance of the provisions of the treaty. The right of observation of what is going on on the high seas or under the high seas already exists under present international law applicable to the high seas; consequently article III of the United States draft does not create any new right or obligation under the treaty. Consultation in the sense of one State making enquiries of another State is also the prevailing feature of normal intercourse between nations of the world and does not amount to an innovation for enforcing observance of the treaty.

23. As regards the undertaking to co-operate, article III (1) of the United States draft does not go beyond an undertaking "to co-operate in endeavouring to resolve the questions". It does not say what happens if the endeavour to resolve the questions, which depends entirely on the will of the suspected State, does not result in the

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1/ United Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 516, pp. 205 et seq.

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satisfaction of the party to the treaty which had complained of an infringement of treaty provisions. Any control provision which does not ensure, with necessary safeguards, a reasonable opportunity for access to the structures and installations placed on the sea-bed would in our view be illusory. Unless such a provision were made, those States which have the capacity to make such emplacements on the sea-bed would be placed in a position of advantage and superiority as compared with all the technologically less advanced States.

24. Therefore the United States draft would not ensure freedom from fear in countries with less developed under-sea technology which apprehended that they might be threatened by weapons or military installations in an adjacent area of the sea-bed. This is not a position which my delegation is prepared to accept. I hope, therefore, that the verification article will provide, with necessary safeguards, reasonable access to all emplacements on the sea-bed.

25. A further question is how the right of verification is to be exercised. It is now generally recognized, we feel, that this right could be exercised by a party to the treaty either with its own resources or, if it did not have the capability, with the full or partial assistance of another State. In this connexion it has been stated by the United States delegation that "it is not desirable at this time to spell out explicit provisions -- that is to say, commitments -- for providing third-party assistance." (ENDC/PV.421, para. 49) It has also been argued that no obligation or open-ended commitment could be placed on States to provide third-party assistance, for reasons both of principle and of the tremendous cost and technical difficulties involved in such assistance (ibid., para. 50). The Soviet delegation seems to agree with this view (ENDC/PV.423, para. 36). Those of us who have insisted on the right of each party to the treaty to carry out verification with the full or partial assistance of another State have suggested, not that parties to the treaty should be placed under an obligation to assist, but only that the right to seek such assistance from parties willing to assist should be recognized and that this should be clearly provided for in the verification article. This is an essential provision for the technologically less advanced countries which form the vast majority of the countries of the world.

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26. In this context some of us have suggested international means of verification to ensure the strict observance of the provisions of the treaty. My delegation has noted that the United States delegation has expressed the view that it regards a special international verification organization as both premature and wasteful of resources because it would amount to setting up an organization equipped to perform tasks which we are not ready to undertake and of which we have so little experience (ENDC/PV.421, para. 48). The Soviet delegation agreed with this when it said:

> "The use of international means of verification would greatly complicate the problem of control, and the control machinery itself would most probably be cumbersome and inflexible. It should also be noted that the adoption of an international system of control would require substantial funds and appropriate personnel that could be used for other, more urgent needs." (ENDC/PV.409, para. 45)

27. While my delegation fully appreciates the concern of the sponsors of the two drafts before us about technical difficulties and financial costs, it is not clear to us why, if the existing technological "know-how" and capacity are adequate for emplacing structures and installations on the sea-bed, they should not also be adequate for verifying what is emplaced. As regards the question of expense, a viable procedure could be devised which would not entail inordinately large expenditure. In this connexion my delegation finds the suggestion made by the Canadian delegation at our meeting on 31 July for organizing verification through the United Nations (ENDC/PV.424, paras. 29, 30) interesting and would commend it for most serious consideration by this Committee. In the view of the delegation of India, the principle of verification through suitable international machinery or agency or arrangement is essentially sound and would go very far in the direction of removing suspicions, lessening tension and creating an international atmosphere of trust. The Canadian suggestion shows how this could be done.

28. Before concluding my remarks on the subject of verification, it is necessary to state that my delegation agrees with the view expressed by some delegations that the treaty must recognize that coastal States have rights of national sovereignty and national jurisdiction in respect of areas contiguous to the territorial sea, principally the continental shelf. If a party to the treaty wishes to proceed with verification outside the twelve-mile zone but within areas of national jurisdiction of the coastal

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State, such verification must obviously be undertaken in consultation with the coastal State and, if it so desires, under its own observation.

29. In conclusion I should like to reiterate, as some of my colleagues have already done, the need for making some definite advance in our negotiations on the sea-bed treaty. Nearly five months have passed since we first began to exchange views on this subject; and while the wide and far-reaching discussions we have had have been valuable and illuminating, the sad fact is that on all the three basic issues on which the treaty is to be based there is as yet no agreement. Indeed, the wide divergence of views on the very nature of the prohibition to be included in the treaty is as sharp and clear as it was on the first day when we began our deliberations on this subject. If this situation continues during the current month, we shall go to the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly empty-handed except that there would be this time a larger number of empty hands than there were last year. It is therefore the hope of my delegation that the sponsors of the two draft treaties before us will take serious note of this situation and consider how differences could be bridged and agreement reached. I have no doubt that, like my delegation, all other delegations are more than anxious to render every possible assistance to achieve this worthy end.

30. Mr. ASAKAI (Japan): First of all, I should like to associate myself with previous speakers in extending a heartfelt welcome to the representatives of Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. It is with pleasure that I see some personal friends among the representatives of those countries. The Japanese delegation looks forward to working closely with them in this Committee in pursuit of our common goals.

31. The purpose of my intervention today is to explain in some detail the views of my Government on the question of the prohibition of chemical and biological weapons. I touched on the basic position of my Government on this subject in my statement in this Committee on 3 July (ENDC/PV.416, paras. 74, 75). As I stated at that time, my Government is of the view that, in order to eliminate the possibility of chemical and biological weapons ever being used, it is imperative that we should prohibit not only the use of these weapons but also their development, production and stockpiling. The earnest desire of the Government and people of Japan to achieve disarmament in the field

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of nuclear weapons is already well known. Our desire to eliminate chemical and biological weapons from military arsenals is no less strong.

32. Most chemical and biological weapons, like nuclear weapons, could be used for the purpose of indiscriminate mass destruction. The effects on mankind of the possible use of these weapons might extend -- again like the effects of nuclear weapons -- over a long period of time. The use of nuclear weapons has already given rise to the problem of sequelae caused by radio-activity which persist over a number of years. We fear that an extensive use of chemical and biological weapons might also have an enduring effect on our ecological environment. Developments in modern science and technology have greatly increased the potential threat of this category of weapons. Effects of chemical and biological warfare on a large scale could be devastating indeed, depriving mankind completely of a habitable environment over quite an extensive area for a long time to come.

33. We value highly the report of the group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons (A/7575), which enlightens us with its scientific analysis of the possible effects of the use of these weapons as well as of the economic and security implications of the development, acquisition and possible use of them. We particularly note that the report states in its conclusion as follows:

> "The prospects for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and hence for peace throughout the world, would brighten significantly if the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents intended for purposes of war were to end and if they were eliminated from all military arsenals." (ibid., para. 376)

Being in full agreement with the view expressed in this passage, the Japanese Government wishes to exert its utmost efforts to bring about an early and effective elimination of these weapons.

34. There are a number of international instruments on chemical and bacteriological weapons. The Hague Declaration of 1899 prohibits the contracting parties from using among themselves projectiles which have the sole purpose of diffusing asphyxiating

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or deleterious gases. The Annex to the Convention concerning the Laws and Customs of Land Warfare signed in 1907 prohibits the use of "poison or poisoned weapons" as well as of "arms, projectiles or material calculated to cause unnecessary suffering". In the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (ibid., p. 117) the contracting parties accept the prohibition of "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices ... so far as they are not already Parties to Treaties prohibiting such use". They also agree "to extend this prohibition to the use of bacteriological methods of warfare".

35. We now have before us, in addition to those existing instruments, a draft convention on the prevention of biological warfare presented to the Committee on 10 July by the United Kingdom delegation (ENDC/255). Whereas all of the existing instruments prohibit only the use in war of the weapons in that category, the prohibition contained in the United Kingdom proposal is extended to cover development, production and stockpiling as well, as far as biological weapons are concerned. The Japanese delegation welcomes such a comprehensive approach.

36. One of the focal points of our discussion on the United Kingdom proposal has been whether it is appropriate to deal, as proposed, with the prohibition of biological weapons first, leaving chemical weapons somewhat behind. It is true that the report of the Secretary-General points out in paragraphs 21 to 31 that chemical and biological agents regarded as weapons of war differ in certain important respects. But the fact that those two kinds of agents differ in nature would not, in itself, lead us to the conclusion that we should take up biological weapons first and put off the prohibition of chemical weapons until a later stage.

37. From a military point of view, biological and chemical weapons could very well be used in war in a closely interrelated manner. International documents, including the Geneva Protocol of 1925 and the recent United Nations resolutions on this subject, have dealt with these weapons together. We cannot be too conclusive either regarding the demarcation itself between biological and chemical weapons. Bacterial toxins, for example, have been classified in different international instruments and publications either as biological agents or as chemical agents.

38. Looking at the matter from another point of view, it may be difficult to satisfy public opinion by first taking up biological weapons, which have never been used against mankind, while postponing the prohibition of chemical weapons, which caused

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actual disaster in the First World War and will pose serious problems to us in future. We have to conclude that, in view of those factors, it seems to be more appropriate to tackle biological and chemical weapons together rather than separately.

39. In translating that position into practical steps, however, we encounter certain difficulties in relation to the treatment of chemical weapons. The first major difficulty is that the verification of compliance is not an easy matter with regard to the production of chemical weapons. The second difficulty is that of reaching an agreement on the scope of the chemical agents to be prohibited.

40. First let me examine the problem of verification. The United Kingdom proposal contains a formula of verification regarding the use of biological weapons which in essence would be to authorize the Secretary-General of the United Nations to carry out automatically an investigation of his own when requested to do so by a party to the convention which believed that biological methods of warfare had been used against it. The Secretary-General would also be authorized to report the result of such an investigation to the Security Council (article III). We consider that formula as one of the important features of the proposal. We believe that it would be able to function to a significant extent as an effective restraint on the use of biological weapons. We believe also that that formula could be similarly applied to the verification of the prohibition of the use of chemical weapons, and could be expected to function effectively to the same extent.

41. If we turn to the prohibition of the production and stockpiling of those weapons we have to admit that the problem of verification becomes more complex, even in the case of biological weapons. The United Kingdom proposal itself provides for a different and somewhat more restrictive procedure on that aspect of the matter, requiring a decision by the Security Council to authorize the Secretary-General to conduct an investigation in each individual case. Furthermore, even if such an investigation were actually carried out, there would be the fundamental difficulty of establishing objective criteria to determine whether a specific case of the production or stockpiling of biological agents had a prophylactic purpose or a military purpose.

42. Compared with the case of chemical weapons, however, the difficulties in this respect may be more susceptible of solution so far as biological weapons are concerned. In the first instance, the kinds of pathogenic micro-organisms a country needs to produce for normal prophylactic purposes can usually be determined by the geographic

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and epidemiological conditions of that country plus, in some cases, the requirements for export of certain vaccines. For example, what country in the world has the need in peace time to produce in large amounts as materials for vaccines tularemia bacilli or Q-fever agent, both of which are capable of being powerful biological weapons?

43. Secondly, there is no need in the present-day vaccines industry to stockpile micro-organisms for a more or less extended period of time in either a live or a freeze-dried state, which would make them effective as weapons. Thus it would be possible to some extent to differentiate the biological agents produced for peaceful purposes and those produced for the purposes of warfare.

44. Unlike the production of biological agents, the production of chemical agents for weapons purposes could be so closely interrelated with the production of chemicals for peaceful purposes that it might be difficult in most cases to arrive at a universally-acceptable judgement on the purpose of a suspicious case. There can be no excuse, of course, for large-scale production and stockpiling of nerve gases or certain chemical end-products, such as mustard. But chemical agents such as phosgene and hydrogen cyanide are important intermediate products in peaceful chemical industry as well as powerful chemical agents for weapons purposes. As a practical problem, therefore, it would be difficult to control and interfere with the production of those chemicals. To make the matter more complicated, the production processes of chemical agents are integrated into the highly complex ramifications of the entire chemical industry. It might therefore be difficult to determine which stage of the complicated processes of production could actually be considered as the stage where weapons were being produced.

45. Despite such difficulties we cannot take the position that the examination of the question of chemical weapons should be postponed until such time as an agreement has been reached on the means of verification on all the aspects of their prohibition. To take such a position would mean separating the prohibition of chemical weapons from that of biological weapons.

46. As I suggested earlier, we will be able to apply the verification procedure prescribed in article III (1) of the United Kingdom draft convention to the use of chemical weapons. As to their production and stockpiling, we also have a keen desire to put a complete end to it. But at the same time there are difficulties I have already pointed out.

(Mr. Asakai, Japan)

47. I therefore should like to suggest that we entrust to a group of competent scientists and technologists, formed on an international basis, the study of the technical problems related to the verification of the production and stockpiling of chemical and biological weapons. I was told that the scientists of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research of Sweden (SIPRI) in Stockholm have just carried out such research, and there may be other studies of the same nature. I hope that the group I have suggested would work on the basis of these studies so that an agreement would be reached by this Committee as soon as possible on an appropriate means of such verification. In this connexion, the subject of verification might include the methods of stockpiling and ancillary equipment as well as agents themselves.

48. With reference to the question of the scope of the chemical agents to be prohibited, it may be necessary to work out more precisely the definition of the agents to be prohibited, as we intend not only to prohibit the use of chemical and biological weapons but also to prohibit their production and stockpiling. Let me recall that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 itself left some ambiguity about the scope of weapons it prohibited, particularly in relation to the harassing agents. In the case of the Geneva Protocol, however, it was only the use in war -- I emphasize "in war" -- of chemical and bacteriological weapons that was prohibited. As the representative of Sweden stated in this Committee on 5 August, "the military purpose makes this use [the use of harassing agents] very different from their use in domestic situations". (ENDC/PV.425, para. 35).

49. Although the Japanese Government has acceded to both the Hague Declaration of 1899 and the Convention on Land Warfare of 1907, it has not yet ratified the Geneva Protocol of 1925. Since the Geneva Protocol prohibits only the use in war of the weapons in question, without touching upon their production and stockpiling, and since different opinions exist as to the interpretation of its coverage, it is, in the view of my delegation, not a fully satisfactory international instrument. The Government of Japan hopes that an agreement to prohibit completely both chemical and biological weapons will be concluded at an early date, and my delegation intends to exert its utmost efforts to this end. It is our hope that we shall be able to co-operate with all the other delegations in this endeavour. If, however, we should find ourselves

(Mr. Asakai, Japan)

in the unfortunate situation that such an agreement cannot be concluded in the near future, my Government would be prepared to consider the ratification of the Geneva Protocol. We would do so as a manifestation of the earnest and strong desire of the people of Japan to eliminate these dreadful weapons completely from the earth.

50. Mr. EDELSTAM (Sweden): My delegation is today placing before the Committee a working paper of a technical nature describing a new seismological station recently inaugurated in Sweden which is intended to increase our knowledge in the field of monitoring underground explosions through seismological methods. I am referring to document ENDC/257, entitled "Working Paper describing the Hagfors Seismological Observatory in Sweden". As the matter of seismic test-ban control and the proposed organized seismological data exchange were dealt with in considerable detail during yesterday's informal meeting of the Committee, I can be brief in my explanations.

51. On 23 May the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff, introduced a working paper (ENDC/251) containing some practical suggestions for achieving an effective world-wide seismological data exchange. In paragraph 2 of that paper the Canadian delegation, inter alia, asked: "what seismic information would governments make available and in what form?". All members of the Committee who have spoken earlier on this issue have stated the view that the problem of verifying a treaty banning underground nuclear tests would be greatly facilitated if guaranteed access to original seismological data could be assured within the framework of an organized exchange of such data. This opinion has also been repeatedly endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly. I need only refer to the latest of its many resolutions on the comprehensive test ban, resolution 2455 (XXIII), where it is said that the General Assembly,

> "Recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, ...
>
> "Expresses the hope that States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data" (ENDC/237).

52. If no real progress can be made now on the basic problem itself, that is, the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear weapon tests, the Committee should at least be able to agree on a plan for initiating the data exchange, which is, as we

(Mr. Edelstam, Sweden)

understand it, a non-controversial matter. I wish to repeat the recommendation made by my delegation in its statement in the Committee on 23 May that

> "... in our report to the General Assembly of the United Nations this matter should be more than briefly mentioned. It marks considerable progress towards laying the foundation for a comprehensive test ban treaty, and ought to be made visible to all United Nations delegations." (ENDC/PV.415, para. 29)

We have now before us the specific proposal made by the delegation of Canada to include in the Committee's report to the General Assembly the suggestion that countries should make available information as to which stations and what sort of seismological data they would be prepared to submit.

53. Summarizing, I wish to state that the purpose of the working paper which the Swedish delegation is putting forward today is to present in a technically valid manner a modest research station and at the same time to indicate the seismological data which this station can furnish to any interested party upon request. Further, we hope that other delegations will hand in similar papers. In such a way a beginning will already have been made towards organized international co-operation in this field.

54. Mr. CZARKOWSKI (Poland): On behalf of the Polish delegation I should like to welcome the new members of this Committee -- Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia. We are convinced that they will contribute constructively to the implementation of the tasks entrusted to us.

55. Our deliberations thus far have eloquently demonstrated considerable interest in the problem of ensuring strict and universal prohibition of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons as well as in taking effective steps designed to eliminate those weapons from the arsenals of States. In this connexion various proposals have been submitted to this Committee.

56. On 22 July the Polish delegation presented a working paper (ENDC/256) concerning the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (A/7575). We have been gratified to find that the proposals contained in our working paper have been favourably received by many delegations around this conference table, and we owe them our thanks.

(Mr. Czarkowski, Poland)

57. The current debate in this Committee has reinforced our conviction that the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament should proceed according to the schedule adopted last year. After all, it was on the initiative of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament that the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to prepare, with the assistance of qualified expert consultants, a report on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII); ENDC/237). The report has been prepared in implementation of that resolution, which also recommended that the report be considered by our Committee and by other United Nations bodies.

58. All the delegations which have addressed the current session of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament have assessed the study as an important contribution to the Committee's deliberations regarding those weapons. It has also met with considerable interest from world public opinion. We have not heard any arguments which sought to cast doubt on any of the thesis advanced in the study. Indeed it could hardly be otherwise, if one bears in mind that the report and its conclusions have behind them the prestige of the Secretary-General and of fourteen prominent scientists representing, as they did, all political and geographical regions of the world. It is obvious, therefore, that the report, as well as U Thant's recommendations, should be recognized by the Committee as a basis and a guideline for further disarmament negotiations concerned with chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

59. To our mind it would not be proper for the Committee, in the further course of its disarmament negotiations, to leave the report of the Secretary-General in the background while concentrating on problems that we feel should be tackled at a later stage of our work. For this reason we consider that the establishment of the basic criteria to guide our future work in this Committee is an important stage that we cannot afford to abandon. In view of these considerations, and against the background of the discussion in our Committee, I should like to refer again to two criteria which my delegation considers to be basic to the undertaking of further steps in the field of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

60. First, any steps concerning chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons should lead to the strengthening of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, p.117). I am glad to notice a consensus appearing in this Committee on the need for the universal

(Mr. Czarkowski, Poland)

observation of and adherence to the Protocol by the States not yet parties to it. This progress is significant because, notwithstanding two appeals by the General Assembly in its resolutions 2162 (XXI) (ENDC/185) and 2454 A (XXIII) and much urging by this Committee, there are many States, including certain big Powers, which have not yet seen fit to accede to the Protocol. In renewing our call to States not yet parties to accede to the Protocol we are discharging the obligation which devolves upon its signatories "to exert every effort to induce other States to accede to the present Protocol". The Polish delegation therefore supports the suggestion which the delegation of the Mongolian People's Republic made at our meeting on 31 July that the Committee issue an appeal to States not parties to the Protocol to sign and ratify that important international instrument before its forty-fifth anniversary -- that is, 17 June 1970 (ENDC/PV.424, para. 105).

61. Second, the problems of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons cannot but be considered jointly. I am gratified that a great number of delegations around this table share this point of view. Only today the representative of Japan has expressed a similar opinion. Many delegations, including my own, have stressed in their statements that there is a close and direct link between those weapons which makes them inseparable -- that in international law, strategic doctrine and the public mind all bacteriological (biological) weapons without exception are linked with chemical weapons. This link stems from the military and technical characteristics of those weapons, integrated in one system, and from the effects of their possible use as weapons of mass destruction. It is this consideration that accounts for the fact that, as was brought to our attention by the representative of Bulgaria at our meeting on 24 July, the term "biochemical weapons" is gaining currency in military vocabulary (ENDC/PV.422, paras. 16 et seq.).

62. Chemical and bacteriological weapons are dealt with jointly in the Geneva Protocol of 1925. We have not heard any convincing argument which would support the idea of dealing with further prohibition aimed at the complete elimination of these two types of weapons in any other way than in the Protocol. Moreover, it is not altogether irrelevant to observe in this connexion that all documents providing terms of reference for our work support joint consideration of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons. I have in mind first of all the Committee's agenda contained in its report

(Mr. Czarkowski, Poland)

of last August (ENDC/236, p.3), General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII) concerning the preparation of the report, and the report itself, dated 1 July 1969, concerning chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use, together with U Thant's foreword containing his recommendations.

63. It is in the light of such general considerations that my delegation wishes to make several observations regarding the consequences which we feel would result from the United Kingdom's draft convention on the prohibition of biological weapons (ENDC/255). We have arrived at two principal conclusions in our assessment of that draft.

64. While its article VI states that nothing in the convention shall be construed as derogating in any way from obligations assumed by any State under the Geneva Protocol, the United Kingdom draft, to our mind, offers in fact a restrictive interpretation of the Protocol. This stems first of all from article I of the draft, which seeks to establish, independently of the existing prohibitions, a new legal prohibition of the use of biological weapons. In this way the United Kingdom reaffirms its earlier position that the Geneva Protocol of 1925 does not apply to biological weapons (ENDC/PV.381, paras. 87 et seq.).

65. The United Kingdom draft convention, moreover, argues for separate treatment of prohibition of the use of biological and of chemical weapons. It is a position that we cannot go along with for the reasons I have given and, first of all, because of the characteristic features of these weapons and the effects of their use.

66. In all considerations concerned with the establishment of further prohibitions in the field of chemical and bacteriological weapons -- namely, the prohibition of their development, production and stockpiling -- the ultimate goal has been to ensure total efficacy of the prohibition of use of these weapons as means of warfare by the elimination of the real possibilities and facilities making their use possible. The various kinds of prohibition are closely interrelated. Uniformity of prohibitions of the use of both chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons requires uniformity of prohibitions applicable to the entire process of preparation for their use as well.

67. A partial solution, separate for each of the two types of weapons, could create a new factual and legal situation which, while far from guaranteeing progress towards elimination of the dangers resulting from biochemical weapons, would provide a deceptive illusion of progress and would affect adversely the effectiveness of the Geneva Protocol of 1925. The possible results of a selective approach to chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons can be formulated in three points.

(Mr. Czarkowski, Poland)

68. First, in the military field, there would arise a new situation which would clearly favour a chemical arms race. So, instead of putting an end to such a race, it would be legalized for an unforeseeable period of time. Moreover, bearing in mind that military characteristics of chemical and bacteriological weapons constitute an integrated weapons system and that identical means of delivery can be used for both, there could arise a situation in which States might be tempted to compensate for their reduced arsenals of biological weapons by an increased effort in the field of chemical weapons. That corresponds to the weird logic of the arms race.

69. Secondly, there seems to be no doubt that a chaotic situation would emerge in the legal sense as separate prohibitions would appear with regard to particular weapons -- prohibitions whose scope, both subjective and objective, would not correspond to one another, creating as a result a mosaic of various legal régimes that would offer broad possibilities of arbitrary interpretation. Such a situation would hardly be conducive to strict and uniform observation of the prohibitions contained in the Geneva Protocol, let alone ensure universal adherence to it.

70. Any disarmament agreement, particularly one involving weapons of mass destruction, constitutes a milestone in the process of the development of international law. We believe, therefore, that the method suggested by the United Kingdom delegation can hardly be reconciled with the goal of codification and a progressive development of international law which not only seeks to supplant specific and concrete legal norms for general ones but also, at the same time, seeks unification of the activities of States in certain particularly important spheres of international relations.

71. Thirdly, to confine oneself in disarmament negotiations exclusively to biological weapons would hardly meet the hopes of the international community raised by such negotiations. World public opinion demands the elimination of the threat of chemical war with the same firmness as that of other barbarous methods of warfare. All of us are aware that public opinion has been particularly concerned over recent Press reports pointing to further intensification by certain States of the chemical arms race and the stockpiling of chemical weapons on foreign soil. The recent mishaps involving chemical weapons stockpiled on Okinawa have brought home to many peoples the danger involved in the stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons on the territories of other States.

(Mr. Czarkowski, Poland)

72. I wish to stress at this juncture that my countrymen have been particularly alarmed at the reports, since officially confirmed, of the stockpiling of chemical weapons on the territory of the German Federal Republic. This fact, in addition to the vast stockpiles of nuclear weapons, creates an additional threat in this sensitive area of key importance to world peace. It certainly will not create a climate favourable to a strengthening of the sense of security of European nations. Public opinion in Poland -- and I am sure I speak for that in many other countries too -- firmly demands the immediate elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons stockpiled on foreign soil.

73. We believe that in order to create an appropriate atmosphere for negotiations it is necessary for States to refrain from any action, whether in the military, political or legal sphere, which could undermine the effectiveness of the prohibitions contained in the Protocol and which, consequently, would adversely affect the possibilities of achieving further prohibitions relating to the development and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

74. In this connexion I should like to express my delegation's concern over the recent statement by the Secretary of Defense of the United States, Mr. Laird, who, as reported by the International Herald Tribune of 29 July (p.1, col.2), stated that "the United States must maintain a stock of chemical and biological warfare agents as a deterrent against that type of attack by other nations". The active promotion of the philosophy of not only nuclear but also chemical-bacteriological "balance of fear" justifying a further chemical and bacteriological arms race can hardly favour the work of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. We refuse to accept the proposition that international relations should be based on the principle of "balance of fear".

75. We cannot avoid mentioning also the attempts undertaken by certain circles in the United States to justify, in the eyes of the public opinion of that country, the need not only to retain existing stocks but also to proceed with the further development of chemical weapons. The old slogan "Learn to live with the nuclear bomb" is now being replaced by a new catch-phrase "Chemical warfare research is good for you".

(Mr. Czarkowski, Poland)

To support this, arguments are being advanced that there is a beneficial spin-off derived from chemical and bacteriological warfare research, a spin-off in the form of discoveries of new medicines.

76. Such actions can hardly be reconciled with the unanimous General Assembly resolution 2454 A (XXIII), which calls on governments to acquaint public opinion with the contents of the Secretary-General's report through various media of communication, and expresses a belief "that the people of the world should be made aware of the consequences of the use of chemical and bacteriological weapons". That is why we cannot go along with actions aimed at convincing public opinion that development of biological and chemical weapons results in benefits.

77. In presenting my remarks I am not motivated by a desire to infuse unnecessary polemics into our debate. We are first and foremost anxious to observe appropriate priorities in the work of this Committee. Those priorities are determined by the current state of the arms race as well as by the scope of the threat resulting from the particular forms of armaments. This applies especially to weapons of mass destruction. The specific feature of those weapons means that mankind is threatened not only by the prospect of their use. In fact the very arms race in these weapons, qualitative, quantitative and territorial, triggers off a number of adverse political, economic and moral consequences affecting the whole international community, while at the same time posing the constant threat of the outbreak of a devastating conflict.

78. There is, of course, little need to mention the state of permanent threat to man's health resulting from those weapons. The dangers inherent in the chemical arms race have been made all too clear in various parts of the Secretary-General's report. Thus it states that -

> "... the preparation of an armoury of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons would constitute a possible danger to people in the vicinity of production, storage and testing facilities." (A/7575, para. 355),

while later on in the report it is observed that the existence of chemical and bacteriological weapons -

(Mr. Czarkowski, Poland)

"... contributes to international tension without compensating military advantages. They generate a sense of insecurity not only in countries which might be potentially belligerent, but also in those which are not." (ibid., para. 369)

79. Bearing in mind the factors I have mentioned, the Polish delegation wishes again to place on record its readiness to co-operate with any delegation with a view to elaborating specific measures that would ensure strict and universal observance of the prohibitions contained in the Geneva Protocol, and subsequently the total elimination of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons from the arsenals of States.

80. Finally I should like to assure this Committee that we are working actively, together with other interested countries, towards achieving the early and comprehensive prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons.

81. Mr. PORTER (United Kingdom): I should like first to express a warm welcome on behalf of my delegation to the six new delegations, those of Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia, which have joined the Committee since we last spoke in formal session. I personally am particularly pleased to see with us here Ambassador Eschauzier of the Netherlands and Ambassador Shahi of Pakistan, with whom I have had the privilege of working closely in the past.

82. My statement today will take the form of a brief introduction to the working paper already circulated by my delegation as document ENDC/258, which deals with United Kingdom research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions. We have had some useful exchanges this year on the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, and for that we are indebted chiefly to the delegations of Sweden and Canada. The Swedish working paper submitted on 1 April (ENDC/242) contained some valuable suggestions which should be kept in mind in future work on this subject. I shall return later to the Canadian proposal of 23 May contained in document ENDC/251.

83. My own contribution today will be confined to the technical aspects of detection and identification of tests by seismic means. The United Kingdom has devoted much effort to this problem. In 1965 the work of United Kingdom scientists was described

(Mr. Porter, United Kingdom)

to this Committee in a working paper (ENDC/155); and we thought it would be useful to prepare another paper on similar lines to summarize the advances made since that date. Some of the material will already be familiar to the Committee from the report of the SIPRI group (ENDC/230), to which United Kingdom scientists contributed; but the working paper does include as an annex a bibliography of publications describing the United Kingdom work. That will complement the valuable list of papers by Canadian scientists in document ENDC/248. Many of the references listed in our paper will, of course, be known to scientists working in this field in other countries; but we thought that a comprehensive bibliography would be useful. The number and titles of papers listed gives some idea of the range of subjects involved and the complexity of the investigations.

84. In the four years since our previous working paper was produced we have seen the acceptance of a new method of positively identifying explosions: that using measurement of surface waves. This is now familiar to us all from the report of the SIPRI group, which made full use of the results obtained by United Kingdom scientists described in the paper submitted today. While recognizing the advances made, we should be on our guard against believing that all the problems associated with the detection and identification of seismic events have been solved with the introduction of that method. The investigations described in today's working paper show that, even with a combination of methods, the nature of events detected below a certain magnitude will remain uncertain.

85. Against that background I should now like to turn to the possibility of improving our detection and identification capability by improving the international exchange of seismic data. We have already in the Worldwide Standard Seismological Network a network of high quality which provides services at very modest cost. Information derived from that network was essential in enabling United Kingdom scientists to do the work described in our paper. Nevertheless we feel, as Mr. Mulley said on 17 April, that

> "We plainly have some way to go before it can be said that adequate international machinery exists to enable States to assure themselves that the best possible use could speedily be made of seismic data obtained throughout the world" (ENDC/PV.404, para. 15).

The contribution of the Worldwide Standard Seismological Network could be improved if other national networks could be integrated with it, as I understand the Canadian national network already is; or, if that is not a practical suggestion on a world-wide scale, if information from other networks were readily available on request.

(Mr. Porter, United Kingdom)

86. The Canadian delegation suggested in its working paper of 23 May that States should communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, for transmission to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a list of stations from which they would be prepared to supply seismic records on the basis of guaranteed availability. A good response to that suggestion would enable us to see just what further information might become available, and from that to estimate what degree of improvement that might bring. My Government is willing to provide the information that would be requested in accordance with the Canadian proposal; and we very much hope that the proposal will be acceptable to other members of this Committee.

87. The next step would be to consider how best to handle the information that became available. Should we rely on bilateral exchange of records, or should we build a system of exchange on the centres already existing? How would we set up the most effective cross-links between participants? How would we standardize operating procedures sufficiently to make records compatible with one another? What extra resources would be necessary? Would it be necessary to process all records, or could some selection be practised? Those are all questions which must be considered before progress in this field can be achieved. They are also, it seems to us, the type of question the representative of Japan had in mind when making his recent thoughtful contribution to the discussion of this subject (ENDC/PV.424).

88. I must, however, make clear that in our view the systems we have at present are unlikely to provide an identification threshold at teleseismic distances much, if at all, lower than the 20-60 kilotons agreed on by the SIPRI group. An improved exchange of data might help us to achieve the best results possible with the existing networks, but it is unlikely to enable us to lower significantly the identification threshold. A better performance could be achieved with greater certainty only by a more costly decision to improve the instrumentation of the existing stations, or better, we believe, by setting up new stations based on the latest techniques.

89. Even if we were to establish the best possible seismic network that we can at present envisage and to achieve the full capabilities of detection and identification foreseen by the SIPRI group, further problems would still remain. One such problem recognized by the SIPRI group was the possibility of reducing the apparent magnitude

(Mr. Porter, United Kingdom)

of an explosion by carrying it out in a suitable thickness of dry alluvium. Alluvium is likely to be present in most continents in thicknesses sufficient to de-couple explosions up to twenty kilotons. On present knowledge, therefore, it is unlikely to be possible by seismic means to achieve from recordings made at great distances a high probability of detecting explosions as large as ten kilotons if fired in dry alluvium. The probability of identifying them would be lower still.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 428th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of H.E. Ambassador James F. Leonard, representative of the United States.

"Statements were made by the representatives of India, Japan, Sweden, Poland and the United Kingdom.

"The representative of Sweden submitted a working paper describing the Hagfors Seismological Observatory in Sweden (ENDC/257).

"The representative of the United Kingdom submitted a document containing further notes on the United Kingdom research on techniques for distinguishing between earthquakes and underground explosions (ENDC/258).

"The representative of Canada submitted a document containing remarks by H.E. Ambassador George Ignatieff, representative of Canada, and by Dr. K. Whitman at the informal meeting on a complete test ban on Wednesday, 13 August 1969 (ENDC/259).

"The representative of Japan submitted a document containing the statement by H.E. Ambassador K. Asakai at the informal meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 13 August 1969 (ENDC/260).

"The representative of India submitted a document containing the statement by H.E. Ambassador M.A. Husain at the informal meeting of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament on 13 August 1969 to consider the question of a comprehensive nuclear test ban (ENDC/261).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Tuesday, 19 August 1969, at 10.30 a.m."

The meeting rose at 12.15 p.m.

CONFERENCE OF THE EIGHTEEN-NATION COMMITTEE ON DISARMAMENT

ENDC/PV.429
19 August 1969
ENGLISH

FINAL VERBATIM RECORD OF THE FOUR HUNDRED AND TWENTY-NINTH MEETING

held at the Palais des Nations, Geneva,
on Tuesday, 19 August 1969, at 10.30 a.m.

Chairman: Mr. A. VRATUSA (Yugoslavia)

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PRESENT AT THE TABLE

Argentina:	Mr. C. ORTIZ de ROZAS
	Mr. A.F. DUMONT
	Mr. O. SARACHO
Brazil	Mr. S.A. FRAZAO
	Mr. P. CABRAL de MELLO
	Mr. L.F. PALMEIRA LAMPREIA
	Mr. M. DARCY de OLIVEIRA
Bulgaria:	Mr. K. CHRISTOV
	Mr. M. KARASSIMEONOV
	Mr. I. PEINIRDJIEV
Burma:	U KYAW MIN
Canada:	Mr. G. IGNATIEFF
	Mr. F.W. CLARK
	Mr. J.R. MORDEN
Czechoslovakia:	Mr. T. LAHODA
	Mr. M. VEJVODA
	Mr. J. CINGROS
Ethiopa:	Mr. A. ZELLEKE
Hungary:	Mr. I. KOMIVES
	Mr. I. SARKADI
	Mr. J. PETRAN
	Mr. S. HAJNAL
India:	Mr. M.A. HUSAIN
	Mr. N. KRISHNAN
	Mr. K.P. JAIN

Italy:	Mr. R. CARACCIOLO
	Mr. F.L. OTTIERI
	Mr. R. BORSARELLI
	Mr. U. PESTALOZZA
Japan:	Mr. K. ASAKAI
	Mr. T. SENGOKU
	Mr. M. OGISO
	Mr. T. SAKAMOTO
Mexico:	Mr. J. CASTANEDA
	Miss E. AGUIRRE
	Mr. R. VALERO
Mongolia:	Mr. M. DUGERSUREN
	Mr. Z. ERENDOO
Morocco:	Mr. A.T. BENHIMA
	Mr. A. CHERKAOUI
	Mr. A.A. KHATTABI
Netherlands:	Mr. H.F. ESCHAUZIER
	Mr. E. ROS
Nigeria:	Alhaji SULE KOLO
	Mr. L.A. MALIKI
Pakistan:	Mr. A. SHAHI
	Mr. K. AHMED
Poland:	Mr. A. CZARKOWSKI
	Mr. A. SKOWRONSKI
	Mr. H. STEPOSZ
	Mr. R. WLAZLO

Romania:	Mr. N. ECOBESCO
	Mr. O. IONESCO
	Mr. C. GEORGESCO
	Mr. A. SASU
Sweden:	Mr. A. EDELSTAM
	Mr. H. BLIX
	Mr. T. BENGTSON
	Mr. R. BOMAN
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:	Mr. A.A. ROSHCHIN
	Mr. R.M. TIMERBAEV
	Mr. V.B. TOULINOV
	Mr. V.A. SEMENOV
United Arab Republic:	Mr. O. SIRRY
	Mr. Y. RIZK
	Mr. M. ISMAIL
United Kingdom:	Mr. I.F. PORTER
	Mr. W.N. HILLIER-FRY
	Mr. R.I.T. CROMARTIE
United States of America:	Mr. J.F. LEONARD
	Mr. N. COTTON
	Mr. A.F. NEIDLE
	Mr. W. GIVAN
Yugoslavia:	Mr. A. VRATUSA
	Mr. M. BOZINOVIC
	Mr. M. VUKOVIC
Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. D. PROTITCH
Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General:	Mr. W. EPSTEIN

1. The CHAIRMAN (Yugoslavia): I declare open the 429th plenary meeting of the Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

2. Mr. IGNATIEFF (Canada): May I say, Mr. Chairman, that I am very happy to welcome you in your position as Chairman of today's meeting.

3. I asked to take the floor this morning in order to introduce briefly a revised Canadian working paper on a possible United Nations request to governments for information about the exchange of seismological data, taking into account as far as possible the useful discussion at our informal meeting of 13 August. The paper which I now submit is a revision of the Canadian working paper of 23 May, and it has been circulated (ENDC/251/Rev.1). Some may consider this further Canadian contribution as being relatively minor when viewed against the background of the magnitude of the problem of ending nuclear tests as a whole. I would say that none would be happier than the Canadian delegation if the international situation and the relationship between the Powers which conduct nuclear tests were to permit a more significant step forward at this time in response to resolution 2455 (XXIII) (ENDC/237) of the United Nations General Assembly.

4. Our initiative is designed as a direct response to the part of that resolution which dealt with the need for the suspension of nuclear and thermonuclear tests. As the representative of Sweden reminded us the other day (ENDC/PV.428, para.51), a section of the preamble of that resolution noted that the General Assembly took into account

> "... the existing possibilities of establishing, through international co-operation, a voluntary exchange of seismic data so as to create a better scientific basis for a national evaluation of seismic events,"

and the resolution went on to express, in its operative part, the hope that "States will contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data".

5. On 13 August various delegations commented on our proposals and offered specific suggestions for consideration. I should like to thank those delegations which made such valuable contributions to our discussions. The meeting, I am convinced, shed some useful light on the kind of action which can realistically be sought in promoting more effective seismic exchanges. I am particularly indebted to our Japanese, United States and Indian colleagues, who provided specific detailed suggestions for improvements to our working paper. The working paper which is submitted today incorporates, as far as possible, the concepts and specific proposals offered by those delegations at our informal meeting.

(Mr. Ignatieff, Canada)

6. I believe that the informal meeting further identified the large measure of agreement that, regardless of different assessments of the precise role which seismology can play in detecting all underground nuclear explosions, increased co-operation -- and particularly an assurance from governments that they would give access to all original seismological data -- would help in finding a solution to the problems of verification of a comprehensive test ban.

7. At the informal meeting I expressed the hope that the Committee would agree to include in its report to the next session of the General Assembly the recommendation that clarification be sought from governments along the lines we have proposed and that an Assembly resolution would be developed to give effect to that proposal. May I at this time, in concluding, record the willingness of my delegation to co-operate with any other delegations in formulating such a resolution for consideration by the United Nations General Assembly.

8. Mr. HUSAIN (India): On 17 April (ENDC/PV.404, paras.36 et seq) among other matters, I expressed generally the views of the Government of India about C and B weapons and the importance my Government attaches to the continued preservation of the validity of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 (A/7575, p.117). I propose to speak today in somewhat greater detail and with particular reference to the report of the Secretary-General on chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and the effects of their possible use (A/7575). It is a matter of deep satisfaction to my delegation that the group of consultant experts has submitted a unanimous report, which, we are sure, would greatly assist the consideration of this important subject. My delegation would like to take this opportunity to congratulate the members of the group and its chairman, Mr. Epstein, and his collaborators on the United Nations staff for the excellent work done and, what is more, completed in the time allocated to the group. My delegation has taken careful note of the Secretary-General's thoughtful and well-considered Foreword to the report, with which we generally agree.

9. The report of the group of experts has confirmed, if indeed any confirmation was necessary, the evil and horrible nature of C and B weapons. The report highlights with scientific clarity the possible effects of their use not only on combatants in war but also on civilians; and in fact by upsetting the ecological balance of nature they could destroy civilized existence itself. The experts in their conclusion have stated:

(Mr. Husain, India)

"The fact that certain chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents are potentially unconfined in their effects, both in space and time, and that their large-scale use could conceivably have deleterious and irreversible effects on the balance of nature adds to the sense of insecurity and tension which the existence of this class of weapons engenders." (ibid., para. 371)

And again:

"Were these weapons ever to be used on a large scale in war, no one could predict how enduring the effects would be, and how they would affect the structure of society and the environment in which we live." (ibid., para. 375)

10. My delegation has no doubt that the widest possible distribution of the report would greatly contribute to a general public awareness of the profoundly dangerous results that would follow if these weapons were ever to be used, and that an aroused public opinion would compel governments to work for the earliest effective elimination of C and B weapons. The first essential step towards this end is a universal adherence to the Geneva Protocol. My delegation therefore strongly supports the recommendation of the Secretary-General that the General Assembly at its twenty-fourth session renew the appeal to all States for the strict observance of the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol, and also the appeal to those States which have not so far acceded to the Protocol to do so soon, as was done in General Assembly resolutions 2162 B (XXI) (ENDC/185) and 2454 A (XXIII) (ENDC/237).

11. My delegation further agrees with the view expressed by the Secretary-General that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol "applies to the use in war of all chemical, bacteriological and biological agents (including tear gas and other harassing agents) which now exist or which may be developed in the future". (A/7575, p. xii) Let me clarify that we are here speaking of "use in war", and it is in that context that it is impossible and unjustifiable to distinguish between lethal and non-lethal chemical agents. The Protocol concerns itself with "use in war" between States, and it does not -- I emphasize "not" -- concern itself with internal use of these agents within the scope of municipal law relating to civil commotion or riot control.

12. It has been argued in the course of our discussions here that the interpretation given by the Secretary-General that the Protocol covered both lethal and non-lethal chemical agents was a matter which should be more appropriately left to the parties to the Protocol. But this issue is not a new one, and has been discussed at length in the

(Mr. Husain, India)

past by parties to the Protocol. When in 1930 the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations was engaged in the preparation for the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, the point arose that a uniform construction should prevail as to whether or not the use of lachrymatory gases was to be considered contrary to the Geneva Protocol. The British Government, in a memorandum submitted to the Preparatory Commission, stated:

"Basing itself on this English text, the British Government have taken the view that the use in war of 'other' gases, including lachrymatory gases, was prohibited."1/

The French Government -- which, incidentally, was the depositary Government of the Geneva Protocol -- agreed and stated categorically:

"All the texts at present in force or proposed in regard to the prohibition of the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or similar gases are identical. In the French delegation's opinion, they apply to all gases employed with a view to toxic action on the human organism, whether the effects of such action are a more or less temporary irritation of certain mucous membranes or whether they cause serious or even fatal lesions ...

The French Government, therefore, considers that the use of lachrymatory gases is covered by the prohibition arising out of the Geneva Protocol of 1925 ...

The fact that, for the maintenance of internal order, the police, when dealing with offenders against the law, sometimes use various appliances discharging irritant gases cannot, in the French delegation's opinion, be adduced in a discussion on this point, since the Protocol ... in question relates only to the use of poisonous or similar gases in war."2/

13. A number of other members of the Preparatory Commission -- and I mention Romania, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, Japan, Spain, the Soviet Union, China, Italy, Canada and Turkey -- all concurred with the British and French interpretation, agreeing that it was not possible to distinguish between lethal and non-lethal gases for purposes of war. There was at the time only one contrary view expressed, that of the United States, which was not and still is not a party to the Protocol.

1/ League of Nations. Documents of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference. Series X, p.311.

2/ Ibid.

(Mr. Husain, India)

14. The argument that it is not possible to refrain from use, in war against an enemy, of agents which have been adapted for peacetime use against one's own population as being clearly more humane than other means is untenable for two reasons. Tear gas and other incapacitating agents are used internally to disperse rioting mobs or to capture criminals; in war they are used not only to incapacitate or immobilize the enemy but thereafter to destroy the enemy more easily and effectively with conventional weapons, which is hardly humane. The indiscriminate bombing of an area just saturated with tear gas would be a temptation too difficult to resist. My delegation agrees with the conclusion reached in the Secretary-General's report, which states:

> "It is true that a considerable effort has also been made to develop chemical agents which have as their purpose not to kill but to reduce a man's capacity to fight. Such agents are used by civil authorities of a number of countries in order to suppress disorders and to control riots, but when used in warfare they would inevitably be employed as an adjunct to other forms of attack, and their over-all effect might be lethal." (A/7575, para. 4)

15. Secondly, it may be possible, sitting in a conference room such as this, to draw a distinction between tear gases and poisonous gases; but on the battlefield escalation from tear gases to more harmful substances would take place easily, rapidly and inevitably.

16. It is the hope of my delegation, therefore, that there will be a clear affirmation that the prohibition contained in the Geneva Protocol applies to the use in war of all C and B agents, including tear gas and other harassing agents, which now exist or may be developed in the future. In this context we agree with the following view taken by the Swedish delegation at our meeting on 5 August that --

> "... although new agreements would be needed to assure a ban through disarmament measures on producing B and C means of warfare, the adoption of any new agreement repeating the prohibition against use contained in the Geneva Protocol might risk, or might be taken by some to risk, undermining the ban contained in that Protocol. In any case it would be superfluous. It would duplicate what has now come to be considered and respected as customary international law." (ENDC/PV.425, para. 28)

(Mr. Husain, India)

17. We have been particularly impressed by the observation in the report of the experts that --

> "... the development of a chemical or bacteriological (biological) armoury, and a defence, implies an economic burden without necessarily imparting any proportionate compensatory advantage to security. And at the same time it imposes a new and continuing threat to future international security." (A/7575, para. 374)

And again that --

> "The prospects for general and complete disarmament under effective international control, and hence for peace throughout the world, would brighten significantly if the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents intended for purposes of war were to end and if they were eliminated from all military arsenals." (ibid., para. 376)

18. From these and other observations follows the third recommendation of the Secretary-General, calling upon all countries to reach agreement to halt the development, production and stockpiling of all chemical and bacteriological (biological) agents for purposes of war and to achieve their effective elimination from the arsenals of weapons (ibid., p. xii).

19. Whereas the prohibition of the use of these weapons in war has been dealt with in the Geneva Protocol, in the light of all that has been revealed in the report we now need to address ourselves to the question of the prevention of the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons. In this connexion there is general agreement among us here that, whatever we may do now with regard to B and C weapons, we should in no way derogate from the obligations most of us have assumed under the Geneva Protocol or undermine the importance and the validity of that document in prohibiting the use in war of these weapons. It is generally agreed also that we in the Committee on Disarmament must now proceed to elaborate a convention or conventions supplementary to the Geneva Protocol to deal with the problem of the development, production and stockpiling of C and B weapons. What we are not agreed on, however, is whether we should deal with C and B weapons in one convention or in two conventions, and, if in two conventions, whether we should deal with them separately or simultaneously -- that is to say, with B weapons now and C weapons later on.

(Mr. Husain, India)

20. We have listened with close attention to the arguments that have been advanced in support of each of the two possible courses of action. Those in favour of dealing with B weapons now and C weapons later have argued that the Secretary-General's report points out the differences that exist between C and B weapons in regard to toxicity, speed of action, duration of effect, specificity, controllability and residual effects. B and C weapons, the argument continues, are also different because, while the latter have been used, the former have never been used; C weapons affect smaller areas and can be used with precision, while B weapons are indiscriminate in their effects and cover vast areas; since B weapons are more devastating and have long-term ecological effects, their total prohibition and elimination is of a more urgent character and therefore should be dealt with first. Further, since there are serious differences over the definition of C weapons, if we were to try to tackle both B and C weapons simultaneously we should make no progress, so it is better to deal with the easier -- namely the B -- weapons first; it has been stressed that the suggestion should be understood to mean, not that nothing should be done about C weapons, but that priority should be given to B weapons and that C weapons should be taken up as soon as practicable thereafter.

21. As against these arguments it has been pointed out that both B and C weapons are classified as weapons of mass destruction, and that since they alone exercise their effects exclusively on living organic matter -- that is to say, human beings, animals and plants -- they need to be dealt with together. The Secretary-General has stated in his report that --

> "All biological processes depend upon chemical or physico-chemical reactions, and what may be regarded today as a biological agent could, tomorrow, ... be treated as chemical." (ibid., para. 19)

Bacterial toxins, for example, as pointed out by the Japanese delegation at our meeting on 14 August, have been classified either as biological or as chemical agents in different international instruments and publications (ENDC/PV.428, para. 37). There is thus an intimate link between B and C agents, and indeed the development of the latter is facilitated by the former.

(Mr. Husain, India)

22. While it is true that C weapons have been used and B weapons have not been used, since 1925 both have been dealt with together in international agreements after the First and the Second World wars -- so also in the respective drafts of a treaty on general and complete disarmament submitted by the United States (ENDC/30 and Corr.1 and Add.1 and 2) and the USSR (ENDC/2/Rev.1 and Corr.1) in 1962. The 1966 and 1968 General Assembly resolutions and the Secretary-General's Report deal with both weapons together. The means of delivery of both B and C agents were practically the same, and in the armed forces of many countries the same services dealt with both of them. Further, if B weapons were to be dealt with now and C weapons left for a later consideration because of difference of opinion over the definition of C weapons, it would intensify the chemical weapons arms race and would seem to legitimize it, particularly since these weapons have been used in the past. That would be unfortunate, because, as the Secretary-General has noted, the threat posed by chemical weapons today derives from the existence of new and far more toxic chemical components than were known fifty years ago (A/7575, para. 3).

23. Finally, a separate treatment of B and C weapons would lead to the weakening of the Protocol because it would appear that the Protocol was deficient and only partially valid. It would be difficult to justify to world opinion why B weapons, which have never been used against mankind, should be dealt with first and C weapons, which have been used several times with disastrous effects, dealt with later at some future, unspecified date.

24. Having carefully considered both sides, the Indian delegation is of the view that on balance it would be advantageous, while dealing with the question of development, production and stockpiling, to deal with both B and C weapons together, or at least simultaneously. In this context my delegation would like to welcome -- as many of us have already done -- the initiative of the United Kingdom delegation in bringing into sharp focus the urgent need for putting an end to the development, production and stockpiling of these weapons. My delegation joins other delegations in thanking and congratulating the United Kingdom delegation for presenting, after a great deal of research work, a well-prepared draft convention on B weapons (ENDC/255) which has already served as an excellent basis for considering the manifold problems which would arise when dealing with questions relating to the elimination of these weapons.

(Mr. Husain, India)

25. The United Kingdom draft convention contains several interesting features and raises issues which would need to be examined very carefully in any future consideration of the subject. Similar work would need to be done for dealing with C weapons, which evidently is beset with even more complex problems of definitions, controls and assurances. It is the hope of my delegation that this work can be undertaken without further delay so that the task of eliminating -- together or simultaneously -- both these weapons of mass destruction from national arsenals can be accomplished in the immediate future.

26. Before I conclude I should like to take this opportunity of welcoming you personally, Mr. Chairman, on joining our deliberations here in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament. To one coming, as you do, from Yugoslavia I do not have to repeat that the connexions between India and Yugoslavia have for a long time been very close and very friendly and that we have together worked hard and over many years in the interests of world peace and security. I warmly welcome you on joining our deliberations and wish you all success in your endeavours to co-operate in the great task ahead of this Committee.

27. Mr. LAHODA (Czechoslovakia): While rightly concentrating our endeavour on the adoption of effective measures against the abominable danger lurking for humanity in the form of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and on reaching an early decision on the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, simultaneously we should not at any moment forget the necessity of dealing as quickly as possible and once and for all with the threat of thermo-nuclear weapons.

28. The Czechoslovak delegation has always considered nuclear disarmament as being of the highest priority and has put it in first place as the main item and the most important part of disarmament. We still continue to see it as the crux of all our activity. The road towards reaching our ultimate target -- general and complete disarmament -- leads only through the fulfilling of this task. Therefore, from the very beginning of our Committee's activity we have been pointing out the necessity of preventing a further increase in the number of States possessing nuclear weapons; seeking the adoption of a ban on their use; and demanding a halt to their production and a complete liquidation of all stockpiles of these monstrous means of mass destruction.

29. However, the core of the danger threatening all life on our earth rests not only in the multiplication and in the spread of these atomic and hydrogen bearers of total destruction but also in their constant advancement and perfection. That is why we are

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systematically striving for a ban on all tests of nuclear weapons and supporting all realistic proposals aimed in that direction which are based on the results of perpetual progress of the ever-broader scientific research and ever more accomplished technology in the field of detecting underground nuclear explosions through national means of detection.

30. As long as we do not achieve decisive success in this sphere, we cannot relent in our endeavour. There is not only the question of the consequences of the frantic nuclear arms race that would be disastrous for all -- not excluding its initiators --, but also the problem of side effects of nuclear tests which at present are already negatively affecting the health of people and life on earth in general. The contamination of the atmosphere by the fallout of nuclear tests has not yet been completely stopped -- as is well known, it was announced recently that a new test with a thermo-nuclear weapon is to be carried out in the Pacific in 1970.

31. Yet there is information at our disposal that underground explosions result in the contamination of pastureland -- and hence the milk supply -- by radioactive iodine. At the same time we hear it openly discussed in professional circles that such so-called "hot" iodine might well concentrate in the thyroid glands of fast-growing children, leading to cancer or stunting. Dr. Kenneth S. Pitzer, President of Stanford University and former Research Director for the United States Atomic Energy Commission, has stated quite clearly that last year's moderate-size tests in Nevada have already caused a multitude of small earthquakes, and that a damaging earthquake could be triggered by the large underground explosions now being planned for Nevada and the Aleutians.

32. Obviously the situation regarding the harmful effects of nuclear tests on populations as it has developed since the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) in 1963, is far from satisfactory and cannot leave us indifferent. It is true that immediately after the conclusion of that agreement on the ban of nuclear tests in three environments the pace of underground testing was rather slow. That might have been due to the fact that in the development of new weapons one could still draw on data resulting from previous intensive atmospheric testing. Soon, however, the technology of underground nuclear testing was advancing at a prodigious rate and the number of tests grew considerably. As a result of that undesirable trend, the number and the strength of underground tests can now be compared with the tests carried out in the atmosphere before the conclusion of the Moscow Treaty. At the present time, for instance, the United States Atomic Energy Commission is planning a series of underground tests in magnitudes of several million tons of TNT in Nevada and Alaska.

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33. It is no secret that there is a direct connexion between the endeavour to produce new and more sophisticated generations of nuclear ballistic weapons, under whatever abbreviation they may be presented to the public and in whatever way they might be excused, and the continuing hectic underground nuclear testing. The one requires the other. The one necessitates the other and the one is directly dependent on the other. They are connected vessels whose contents are constantly being improved. More up-to-date and quicker multiple-purpose missiles require more effective and lighter, but mightier, warheads. All that, of course, requires uninterrupted research, checking, testing. And there are the roots of the pretext for objections raised in the form of apprehensions with respect to a possible violation of the ban after its adoption and for the unfounded demand for on-site inspections, whether regular or by invitation.

34. Even if we are aware of the true reason for our difficulties in negotiating a comprehensive test ban and do not underestimate the fact that two of the five nuclear Powers are standing apart from the partial test-ban Treaty already adopted, not bound by any obligations --which certainly is not beneficial for our cause --, and we still must not fold our arms and wait patiently until it is too late for any reasonable measure in this respect.

35. Owing to the fact that it is in the first place a question of a political decision, and only in the second place a question of solving all the technical details and unclear points connected with the advancement of scientific research in the field of seismology, we believe that our negotiations should take into account particularly that aspect of the problem. We must avoid becoming bogged down in highly specific spheres of the intricate science of seismology, with its many problems. Such a procedure could reduce the whole problem of the underground test ban solely to that of detection capacity; and through its long-term examination it could complicate and undesirably delay the basic solution, which applies rather to the halting of the nuclear arms race than to achieving absolute certainty that the smallest tremor of the earth will be registered everywhere.

36. That does not mean that we want to overlook the technical aspect of the question under discussion, or that we do not recognize the need for the most accurate recording of all seismic phenomena; but we see it only as a supporting factor which has its function, its sense and its application only in ensuring and checking upon the fulfilment of the adopted commitment, which should be the total prohibition of all nuclear tests for military purposes. That is our principal task. What we want is, in the first place, to take a further step on the road towards nuclear disarmament, to strive for the fulfilment of article VI of the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*).

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

37. That is why we place certain hope in the long-announced and fervently-awaited negotiations between the Soviet Union and the United States on the limitation of both offensive and defensive missile systems. We are convinced that the success of those bilateral talks, which should start without further delay, would beneficially influence also the question of the underground test ban. Moreover, that conviction is supported by the significant fact that one of the decisive great Powers, the Soviet Union, has more than once in this Committee expressed its willingness to accept immediately an underground test ban based on verification by national means of detection.

38. The Czechoslovak delegation considers national means of detection to be completely satisfactory for the given purpose, and that a solution based on their application would be the easiest practicable, the speediest and the most effective one, because it could immediately put an end to underground testing and stop further development leading to a deterioration of the existing situation. For that reason my delegation does not regard any demand for on-site inspection or inspection on invitation as a contribution to or help in our endeavour. Such inspection is not necessary from the practical point of view and could only complicate and hinder the attainment of a timely and desirable solution.

39. In that connexion, for one thing, I should like to thank the Swedish delegation for the explanation delivered at an informal spring meeting in reply to our questions concerning the inter-relationship between the individual paragraphs of article II of the Swedish working paper ENDC/242. At the same time, however, I should like to state that the view claiming inspection upon request to be necessary in certain cases weakens the Swedish initiative, for which we have expressed our appreciation, and to a certain extent paralyzes the otherwise inspiring and constructive suggestions contained in that working paper.

40. Although we believe a complete and once-and-for-all solution of the question of the ban on underground nuclear tests to be possible and quite practicable with the safeguards of national means of detection, we are willing, in the interest of bridging contradictory attitudes towards that approach, to support also suggestions for the adoption of a ban on underground nuclear tests up to a certain level of their explosive strength, and for declaring a moratorium for explosions below that level. We hold that in the existing situation such a compromise concept has even now its justification in order that we might make progress in our negotiations. In that belief we are starting from the assumption that in case of its adoption the demands for on-site inspection in any form, which so far have been blocking all our endeavours in this field, would finally cease.

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41. As for the doubts that could be voiced in connexion with the possibility of clandestine explosions of very small magnitude covered by the moratorium, we cannot take them seriously when we realize that any State considering such violation of the ban and breach of the accepted commitments would necessarily have to take into account the insupportable risk of its inadmissible activity being detected and to face the most serious international consequences, which would in no way be commensurate with the results gained by that procedure. Apart from that, one has to bear in mind that for any significant advancement of nuclear weapons a whole series of nuclear explosions of high magnitude is necessary and not only a few small explosions that could not fulfil their purpose. A not insignificant influence on the observance of the ban would be exercised also by the circumstances that an overwhelming majority of all States throughout the world have a practical interest in it. As signatories of the treaty they would represent a guarantee that they would do their utmost to preserve its lasting validity.

42. An undeniable role would also be played by the constantly improving and expanding network of international exchange of seismic information that would gradually be supplemented by much more sensitive and effective devices and enriched by new experiences from space research, as was indicated by the information about transmission of seismic data from the moon to the earth over a distance of hundreds of thousands of kilometres.

43. Permit me to quote further, in favour of the said compromise solution, the opinion of a leading United States scientist, Professor Jerome B. Wiesner, Provost of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former scientific adviser to the United States President, which has a direct bearing on this subject. In support of the demand for a speedy ban on underground nuclear tests, voiced by him and 100 other prominent United States scientists and public figures in a letter of 1 July addressed to the President of the United States, Dr. Wiesner stated at a Press conference in New York:

> "One of the principal objections to such a treaty" -- meaning the underground test ban treaty -- "has been the United States concern that other nations could easily violate such a treaty unless a suitable on-site inspection mechanism were devised. Based on available scientific data, these United States objections are no longer valid, for, according to the most highly-respected authorities, there is no doubt whatever that a very effective means of monitoring such tests without

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on-site inspection is available. Moreover, if all tests of ten kilotons in granite -- equivalent to a seismic magnitude of 4.5 or above -- were banned, no on-site inspection at all would be required."

44. I would like to add a few words on the subject of international co-operation in exchanging seismographic information, to which our last informal meeting was devoted thanks to the Canadian delegation, and which has also been the content of today's address of the representative of Canada, Ambassador Ignatieff. The Czechoslovak delegation will carefully study all interventions concerning this matter as well as the working papers submitted on it in recent days. We shall take them into account while further considering the problems connected with the promotion of the exchange of seismic information.

45. Again in this connexion, I should like to give the assurance that the Czechoslovak Republic is prepared to participate in the specific exchange of seismic data in the so-called detection club if this will facilitate the conclusion of a comprehensive test ban treaty on the basis of national means of control and serve the safeguarding of the fulfilment of commitments following from that treaty.

46. At this stage I may inform the Committee that Czechoslovakia has been participating in the international exchange of seismic information for decades, and that on the Czechoslovak territory there are at present seven monitoring stations in operation which are interconnected with the world seismic network. Data on the location of the stations and on the apparatus used are being published in seismographic bulletins. These bulletins are distributed at regular intervals of ten days, one month and one year, and contain evaluation of the data from the seismographs. If a foreign station or a foreign expert needs the original readings of their copies, they receive them upon request. Without this exchange and without collecting the data from the network of stations their existence would be deprived of any sense. Therefore the Czechoslovak stations observe the customs of international exchange, publish bulletins and distribute and receive copies of readings. The bulletins are sent first of all to the two main world centres of the International Association for Seismology (IASPEI) at Strasbourg and Edinburgh, and further to the centres in Moscow and Washington. Apart from that the bulletins are sent to some 200 stations and institutes.

(Mr. Lahoda, Czechoslovakia)

47. As far as an expansion and intensification of this activity are concerned, I should like to point out the view held by our experts that the necessary improvement of the existing international co-operation that would take into account not only the aspect of effectiveness but also that of restricting unnecessary financial cost has to be accomplished within the framework of the existing system by increasing its present performance. Here, of course, we are aware that, in the event of the conclusion of an underground nuclear test ban, the present level of the Czechoslovak seismographic network would have to be improved and its equipment modernized so that the Czechoslovak contribution to the international exchange of information in checking on any possible breach of that treaty would be in keeping with the needs of desirable detection capacity.

48. In connexion with problems of international exchange of seismic information, the question was raised whether such exchange of information should not result in establishing a special international data-processing centre, whose competence would possibly reach to the territories of the participating countries. In our opinion, already expressed in our earlier debate, such procedure is not indispensable and would, on the contrary, in no way facilitate or simplify our task. We hold the view that the processing of all data should be exclusively a matter for the individual participants in the underground test-ban treaty.

49. In conclusion may I, on behalf of the Czechoslovak delegation and on my own behalf, welcome among us the new members of our Committee, the representatives of Argentina, Hungary, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan and Yugoslavia? I believe that, together with the new members of the Committee, the representatives of Asia, Africa, America and Europe, we shall more quickly arrive at the solution of problems which through their importance are reaching to all continents. I should like to use this occasion to assure the representatives of the six new member countries of the Committee that in the Czechoslovak delegation they will always find readiness for mutual co-operation.

50. Mr. SHAHI (Pakistan): I should like to begin my statement by thanking on behalf of my delegation all the heads of delegations and representatives who have welcomed the inclusion of Pakistan in the Committee on Disarmament. To Ambassador Porter of the United Kingdom may I say how much I appreciated the reference he made to me personally? It gives me great pleasure, Mr. Chairman, to be able to speak today with you as the presiding officer. I look forward to our co-operation in the same spirit here as in New York.

(Mr. Shahi, Pakistan)

51. This Committee consists of the representatives of members of the two alliances, headed by the co-Chairman, and of a number of non-aligned nations. We should like to pay tribute to the Western and socialist countries for placing their common interests in maintaining peace and promoting security in the nuclear era above their ideological and political differences, and for persevering in the negotiations for measures of arms control and disarmament despite setbacks and tensions. If today outer space and Antarctica -- and soon we hope the sea-bed and the ocean floor -- are free from the presence of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, if life on this planet is relatively more secure from the hazards of radiation, and if there is greater hope that the danger of a further spread of nuclear weapons may diminish, it is mainly due to the high sense of responsibility of the members of the two alliances headed by the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

52. To say this is not to detract from the notable contribution made to the arms control agreements which have so far been concluded by the eight non-aligned members of this Committee. They have played the role of catalyst and not infrequently have put forward creative ideas which have eased the positions and bridged the differences of the member States of NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In particular, their contribution to the successful negotiations on the partial test-ban Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) was outstanding.

53. In the first statement of my delegation in this Committee at its meeting on 7 August I said that our participation in this body could not but stem from a consciousness of our limitations and of the role of leadership of the great armed Powers and in particular the two super-Powers (ENDC/PV.426, para.22). At the same time let me assure all my colleagues that within the framework of the policy of bilateralism of President Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan -- a policy of consolidating our friendly relations with all the major Powers without detriment to our relations with any of them -- the Pakistan delegation will be ready at all times to make whatever contribution it can to the reconciliation of differences and the promotion of harmony and agreement in the search for disarmament.

54. The United Nations is a general assembly of great and small Powers established on the basis of the principle of the sovereign equality of States. But more than in any other international forum it becomes manifest here that equality of status does not extend to function. It was said the other day that never before in history

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have so few States enjoyed such an accumulation of military power. Each of the two super-Powers has at its command the "assured destruction capacity" -- and I should say more to spare -- to wipe out not only the other but all mankind. Countries such as my own which have neither the will nor the ability to manufacture weapons of mass destruction or even sophisticated conventional armaments cannot but feel that with our own small weight in such scales of power a primary task lies in heightening the consciousness of the moral law and the commensurate sense of responsibility of those who hold in their hands the power of life and death for the human race.

55. For Pakistan, situated as it is close to the heartland of the great Euro-Asian continent with three great countries as neighbours, geopolitical compulsion is a force which cannot be disregarded in shaping its outlook on security. An arms balance in our region, maintained through a stable equilibrium of great-Power relationships, is of the greatest importance to peace in Asia and the world. It should not be surprising, therefore, that Pakistan should have followed with great interest for several years the disarmament proceedings in the First Committee of the General Assembly of the United Nations and in the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament.

56. To the extent possible my delegation participated actively in the debates in the First Committee on partial measures of disarmament, general and complete disarmament and collateral measures. It supported the conclusion of the agreements on arms control. We are signatories of the partial test-ban Treaty and the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) annex). We pressed for the urgent conclusion of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) and have fully endorsed its objectives. In regard to the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States held in Geneva last year, my colleagues are aware of the initiatives taken by the delegation of Pakistan.

57. I should like to mention also that in 1957 the First Committee and the General Assembly adopted an amendment sponsored by Costa Rica and Pakistan to one of the disarmament resolutions to the effect that savings from measures of disarmament should be earmarked for raising the standard of living of peoples and more especially of peoples of the developing countries. In 1960 Pakistan made a proposal for a United Nations study on the economic and social consequences of disarmament. This was unanimously adopted as resolution 1516 (XV). The report of the experts pursuant to that resolution has been largely instrumental in dispelling the widely-held notion that the problems and difficulties of transition connected with disarmament

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would be such as to cause an economic depression in the disarming countries and even in the world. The conclusion of the experts was quite the contrary. They affirmed that --

"...the diversion to peaceful purposes of resources now in military use could be accomplished to the benefit of all countries and lead to the improvement of world economic and social conditions." (E/3593/Rev.1, para.195)

58. Speaking of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, Mr. Zagari, the head of the delegation of Italy at this Committee's spring session, said that the Conference had already played a valuable role in the identification of the problems of major interest in the field of the peaceful exploitation of nuclear energy (ENDC/PV.397, para.60).

59. These problems, as well as the questions of strengthening the non-proliferation regime and the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, which were the three principal items on the agenda of the Conference, were explored in such depth and range at that Conference that new insight was acquired into their ramifications and dimensions.

60. Pursuant to General Assembly resolution 2456 A (XXIII) (ENDC/237), which ensorsed the Declaration of the Conference, took note of its resolutions and called for reports on the different aspects of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy from the specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, the reports will be considered at the twenty-fourth session of the General Assembly. The forthcoming session will also consider the question of further international co-operation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, with particular regard to the special needs and interests of the developing countries. For those countries the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States provided a unique forum for the articulation of their aspirations, and was a symbol of their determination to realize for themselves their share of the promise of the nuclear age.

61. On the question of how best to assure the security of non-nuclear-weapon States, the Conference recommended that they study the possibility of establishing by treaty -- on the precedent of the Treaty of Tlatelolco for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America (ENDC/136) -- the military denuclearization of their zones, provided that political and security conditions permit. It is true that, in respect of their security against the nuclear threat, the discussions of the Conference were inconclusive; but the Conference was not meant to traverse the whole range of this problem. It did focus attention on the need for strengthening the security of the non-nuclear-weapon States independently of military alliances. The Conference also demonstrated strong support for the non-proliferation Treaty.

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62. It was heartening to hear what the representatives of the Soviet Union and the United States had to say at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly in the disarmament debate. At the meeting of the First Committee on 23 November 1968 Ambassador Roshchin said:

> "The Soviet Union, attaching great importance to security problems, shares the legitimate aspirations of the States of the world with regard to ensuring lasting security for their peoples, especially against nuclear attack or the threat of such attack." (A/C.1/PV.1624, provisional, p.7)

He went on to say:

> "There is no doubt that security and disarmament are so closely linked that they are two parts of one single whole." (ibid.)

63. The representative of the United States, Ambassador Foster, said at the meeting of the First Committee on 19 November 1968:

> "The effort to strengthen world security must be pursued unceasingly in existing bodies in the United Nations, where all Members bear a responsibility. Let us therefore resolve to do so, bearing in mind the views expressed and suggestions made at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States. We will play our part in that effort." (A/C.1/PV.1611, provisional, p.32)

64. The present session of this Conference on Disarmament is nearing its end. In just about four weeks, the General Assembly will convene for its twenty-fourth session. It will discuss the report from our two co-Chairmen and evaluate our discussions. It will expect at least some real progress towards general and complete disarmament, if not solutions to the complex of problems which have to be found in order to realize that goal. It will want to know what we have been able to achieve in the field of collateral measures. And, more especially, the General Assembly may be expected to consider the extent to which the nuclear-weapon Powers have pursued negotiations on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, as pledged by them in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty.

65. All of us are only too well aware of the situation that we, as members of this Committee, will have to face in the forthcoming session of the General Assembly. The reason why my delegation is repeating what other representatives have already stated so forcefully, is that all of us may intensify and accelerate our efforts to give the maximum possible effect to the various recommendations made by the General Assembly

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at its twenty-third session and which have been transmitted to this Committee by the Secretary General (ENDC/237).

66. In this context the Pakistan delegation would like to recall General Assembly resolution 2373 (XXII) of 12 June 1968 (ENDC/226*). Pakistan voted in favour of that resolution commending the non-proliferation Treaty. The same resolution requested the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament urgently to pursue negotiations on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament. Those of us who were present at the resumed twenty-second session last year and at the first part of that session in December 1967 will be able to recall the deep impression that was made on the First Committee when the representatives of the Soviet Union, the United States and the United Kingdom made repeated interventions in the debate to assure all the non-nuclear-weapon States of their sincere intention to press forward seriously the search for nuclear disarmament. As a result resolution 2373 (XXII) was adopted, requesting the Depositary Governments to open the non-proliferation Treaty for signature and ratification. It is salutary to remind ourselves that we have yet to bring the Treaty into force and make it universally applicable.

67. With this background, it is only to be expected that the General Assembly will continue to pre-occupy itself with the question of vertical non-proliferation. It is true that the period of fourteen months that has passed since the adoption of the non-proliferation Treaty is not a long time for finding solutions to questions of such complexity as a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the cessation of production of fissionable material for weapons purposes, and the reduction and eventual elimination of the stockpiles of nuclear weapons, or for the formulation of a convention on the prohibition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. But it seems to us that fifteen months is not too short a time for this Committee to register some real progress towards effective measures for halting the nuclear arms race -- considering that this Committee has been seized of these same issues for the past several years.

68. If we turn to the present status of the questions before us and apply even this modest yardstick, we find that we have still much distance to travel before we can inform the General Assembly of some advance. My delegation is only to conscious that Pakistan is a new member of this Committee and that we should accumulate more experience before we venture to express ourselves definitively in regard to the measures that could be considered realistically possible at this time to enable this

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Committee to move forward. Nevertheless, confident of the courtesy and indulgence of my more experienced colleagues -- particularly those who represent the nuclear-weapon Powers -- permit me to express certain preliminary views on behalf of the Pakistan delegation on measures of arms control and collateral disarmament, reserving our right to speak on other questions at subsequent meetings.

69. First, the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty. We face an impasse. The United States maintains that adequate verification of underground events -- that is, the differentiation between earthquakes and man-made explosions -- requires obligatory on-site inspection in addition to seismic detection and identification techniques (ENDC/PV.401, paras. 19 et seq). The stand of the Soviet Union is opposed to any such inspection. The Soviet Union insists that no international inspection in any form is required, and that "national means of detection" are adequate to reveal possible violations of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear tests (ENDC/PV.415, paras. 108 et seq.). In spite of the artifices of Mrs. Alva Myrdal, the head of the Swedish delegation, the two super-Powers are not to be "enticed" into coming forward with more precise alternatives (ENDC/PV.415, para.40).

70. For our part we cannot conceal our admiration for the sophisticated approach in her working paper on the possible provisions of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests (ENDC/242). The concept of control envisaged by Sweden -- that is, to set up a deterrent to clandestine underground explosions in violation of a treaty obligation by a sufficient probability of being exposed -- is, we believe, not an unrealistic one. It is inconceivable to us that either super-Power, once it had accepted such an obligation, would not scrupulously honour it. It is also difficult to believe that for the sake of a comparatively minor advantage it would consider acceptable even a ten per cent risk of exposure and a complaint to the Security Council, which would gravely damage its credibility and good faith in the eyes of the whole world.

71. It is clear that the provision in article II paragraph 3 (c) of the Swedish working paper of a deterrent through "verification by challenge" to invite on-site inspection of the very few seismic events which cannot be identified by improved seismic means and international exchange of seismic data, provided for in paragraph 2 of article II of the working paper, is a highly constructive move to preclude, for all practical purposes, the probability of violations of a treaty on the complete prohibition of nuclear-weapon tests; and it is also a praiseworthy effort to find a way out of the deadlock in the negotiations on that question. We share the view that any arms-control agreement would involve taking a calculated risk. The concept of a no-risk arms-control agreement ignores the larger and more dangerous consequences of an escalation of the arms race.

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72. It is discouraging that the working paper of the Swedish delegation is, for contrary reasons, not acceptable to the nuclear-weapon Powers, and that yet another initiative in this Committee to break the deadlock should be of no avail. The General Assembly cannot but be profoundly concerned at the lack of progress towards the elaboration of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, to which it attaches such great urgency.

73. The present prospect for a comprehensive test-ban treaty was summed up in the following words by the head of the Japanese delegation, Mr. Asakai, on 31 July:

> "... so long as one takes the position that an underground test-ban treaty should not be concluded unless all underground explosions, however small, are to be detected and identified, there will be no chance for a complete underground test-ban treaty in the foreseeable future. In order to conclude a treaty prohibiting all underground nuclear-weapon tests one has to start from the premise that a political decision has to be made to prohibit all such tests when a means is devised to detect and identify underground explosions above a certain limit in size" (ENDC/PV.424, para. 42)

Mr. Asakai pointed out that the size should be of a magnitude of 4.75, as explosions above that level can be identified even at present (ibid., para.43)

74. At the twenty-third session of the General Assembly, the First Committee evinced great interest in the conclusion reached by the meeting of experts of ten countries, including four from nuclear-weapon States, held in Stockholm last year under the auspices of the International Institute for Peace and Conflict Research (SIPRI) (ENDC/230). That conclusion was that, as far as seismic events of a magnitude of 4.75 were concerned, it would be possible to differentiate nuclear explosions from earthquakes with almost 100 per cent accuracy from outside the country in which they occurred. Accordingly I stated on behalf of my delegation that a way had been opened for a political decision by the nuclear-weapon Powers to ban underground weapon explosions of moderate and large yields which are verifiable without on-site inspection.

75. My delegation therefore commends the Japanese proposal that, as a first step, agreement should be reached without delay to prohibit underground nuclear-weapon tests above magnitude 4.75, which would not require on-site inspection, while securing a commitment by all States to co-operate with each other with a view to devising within a certain period of time a system of verification which would be able to monitor all underground explosions above magnitude 4.0 (ENDC/PV.424, para.46).

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76. At this point my delegation would like to remind this Committee that the proposal for a threshold underground test-ban treaty is supported by the informed judgement of some leading scientists in the world. In our view, even if the continuation of testing below the threshold would not be without military significance, it would hardly pose a danger to the nuclear balance but, on the contrary, by ending high-yield test explosions, particularly in the megaton range, would slow the nuclear arms race and be conducive to the stabilization of the balance.

77. We agree with those delegations which have affirmed that what is required above all for progress towards the conclusion of a comprehensive test-ban treaty -- or even a threshold treaty for that matter -- is the political will to reach agreement. Given the political will, the scientific and technical means to verify compliance with such a treaty would not be too difficult to devise.

78. A proposal has been made by Canada in document ENDC/251 that States should communicate to the Secretary-General, for transmission to the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament, a list of stations from which they would be prepared to supply seismic records on the basis of guaranteed availability. The representative of Japan has also spelt out proposals for exchange of seismological data on a world-wide basis and the establishment of international centres for processing them promptly, and for monitoring to check against falsification of information (ENDC/PV.424, paras. 47 et seq.). We consider those to be highly constructive proposals which would enhance the possibilities of lowering the identification thresholds, thereby facilitating the realization of the total prohibition of underground nuclear-weapon test explosions. In resolution 2455 (XXIII) the General Assembly, recognizing the importance of seismology in the verification of the observance of a treaty banning underground nuclear-weapon tests, expressed the hope that States would contribute to an effective international exchange of seismic data. In that context the concrete proposal made by Canada in document ENDC/251 would, if adopted, constitute a positive step by this Committee towards implementing that resolution and reducing the problems of verifying a comprehensive test-ban treaty.

79. The fact is that a series of large-scale nuclear-weapon tests is being carried out to check new warheads for strategic offensive missile systems, including multiple-warhead missiles, and also for systems of antiballistic missile defence. Thus the questions of cessation of testing and limitation of strategic nuclear arms have become interlinked. It has therefore become more urgent than ever for the discussion to

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take place between the United States and the Soviet Union on the limitation and reduction of both offensive strategic nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems of defence against ballistic missiles, in implementation of their agreement of July 1968.

80. The Conference of Non-Nuclear-weapon States unanimously adopted last September resolution D sponsored by my delegation urging the two super-Powers to enter into bilateral discussions at an early date. It was stated in the preamble to that resolution that those negotiations "should aim at, and lead to, negotiations" -- in good faith -- "among all [nuclear-weapon] Powers with a view to the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to the achievement of nuclear disarmament and relaxation of tensions". (A/7277, p.7). The General Assembly at its twenty-third session endorsed a similar resolution (General Assembly resolution 2456 D (XXIII); ENDC/237).

81. The whole world is concerned that, if the bilateral talks are further delayed, the development of multiple-warhead missiles could pass a point of no return and become impossible to control. An open-ended competition cannot but threaten the equilibrium of mutual deterrence, on which peace now depends. Apart from their "mutuality of interests" in limiting the weapons of strategic warfare, the United States and the Soviet Union, as well as the United Kingdom, are pledged to the non-nuclear-weapon States in article VI of the non-proliferation Treaty to end the nuclear arms race at an early date. We have confidence in the good faith of the nuclear-weapon Powers, and we fully appreciate the almost incredible complexity of the decisions they must make; but we fear that loss of time may well result in loss of ability to fulfil that obligation.

82. As a first step towards halting the nuclear arms race at an early date, the United States has once again offered to negotiate an agreement to halt the production for weapons purposes of fissionable material (ENDC/PV.397, para. 20; ENDC/239*, p.2), which is the essential ingredient for a nuclear bomb. Now, however, the United States has proposed an inspection system embodying the approach to the verification problem contained in article III of the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/PV.401, para. 15). Under that article the International Atomic Energy Agency would apply its safeguards system as the means for preventing the diversion of nuclear material by non-nuclear-weapon States to use in weapons. We agree that the United States proposal falls far short of proposing a reduction of the existing stockpiles of nuclear weapons; and it would not diminish the possibility of the further production of such weapons, much

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less the threat of a nuclear war. However, we believe it would represent another step in the direction of arms control and limitation which might well facilitate other and more important measures of vertical non-proliferation.

83. At the same time we must admit that its significance would have been much greater had the offer been acted upon when it was first made thirteen years ago; but it was then tied to less acceptable inspection provisions. The prospect that the United States offer holds of making available for peaceful purposes considerable quantities of fissionable material cannot but be welcome to the non-nuclear-weapon States.

84. Let me now turn to the question of peaceful nuclear explosions. It is now accepted that this question is linked with a comprehensive test ban, this aspect of the matter underlining the urgency of a universal and comprehensive solution of the problem of nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes compatible with a comprehensive test-ban treaty. Resolution L of the Conference of Non-Nuclear Weapon States, of which Sweden was a sponsor, gave expression in its preamble to the need for creating by a separate international instrument a regime aiming at regulating and controlling internationally all explosions for peaceful purposes as exceptions from the general prohibition under the comprehensive test ban (A/7277, p.16).

85. Paragraph 3 of article I of the Swedish working paper ENDC/242 is in conformity with this provision of Resolution L. My delegation has read with great interest the explanation and elucidation given by Mrs. Myrdal at the meeting of this Committee on 23 May (ENDC/PV.415) and notes in particular that there is no contradiction between the Swedish paragraph 3 and article V of the non-proliferation treaty. It would seem to my delegation that, whereas article V of the non-proliferation treaty leaves the nuclear-weapon Powers entirely free to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions, the international agreement envisaged in the Swedish working paper will place all States, nuclear as well as non-nuclear, on a par and that the nuclear weapon States will also be governed by the terms of an international agreement if they wish to carry out peaceful nuclear explosions. My delegation takes particular note of Mrs. Myrdal's statement on 23 May, as follows:

> "But a further step will be indicated in the context of the comprehensive test ban, when not only explosions performed in non-nuclear-weapon States should be regulated so as not to permit them to acquire nuclear weapons, but

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all nuclear weapon tests -- that is, specifically underground explosions within all signatory countries and performed by any signatory State must be encompassed by the prohibition." (Ibid. para. 36).

86. In this context, may I quote from my statement in the First Committee of the General Assembly at its twenty-third session on 4 December 1968, in the disarmament debate? I said then:

"My delegation subscribes to the view that an international régime for peaceful nuclear explosions should be established within the framework of the International Atomic Energy Agency. While providing access to the required technology, however, such a régime should also guard against the danger of dissemination of nuclear weapons ... It is therefore imperative that for a State to be given the benefit of access to the technology of nuclear explosions and the right of participation in international supervision of such explosions, that State should renounce the manufacture of nuclear weapons by a binding multilateral agreement and accept the international safeguard system to prevent the diversion of nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or to other nuclear explosive devices. Unless that requirement is met and a balance established between rights and obligations, it is difficult to see how the régime for peaceful nuclear explosions may not be converted into a régime for the dissemination of nuclear weapons." (A/C.1/PV.1629, provisional, pp.23, 24-25)

That is what I said in the First Committee, and it represents our view.

87. At the meeting of this Committee on 20 May, Ambassador Fisher of the United States read out the joint communique which was issued on behalf of the United States and the Soviet Union in Vienna in the middle of April this year, after their technical discussions on the peaceful uses of nuclear explosions (ENDC/PV.412, para. 43). The prospect of utilizing such explosions for large-scale development projects, we are happy to know, is not too far off. Consequently, the attention of the United Nations will have to be focused before long on the contents of an international instrument for creating a régime for peaceful nuclear explosions while safeguarding against its conversion into a régime for the dissemination of nuclear weapons.

88. Another collateral measure which has been discussed for several years both in the First Committee of the General Assembly and in this Committee is the proposal for the prohibition of the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons. The General Assembly has

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already declared in resolution 1653 (XVI) that any State using these weapons "is to be considered as violating the Charter of the United Nations, as acting contrary to the laws of humanity and as committing a crime against mankind and civilization".

89. There has been no consensus in this Committee in regard to a draft convention which would ban the use of such weapons. As far as the position of my own delegation is concerned, Pakistan voted for General Assembly resolution 2289 (XXII) (ENDC/210), which expresses the conviction that it is essential to examine the question of the conclusion of an appropriate convention on the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. While my delegation will continue to support any well-considered initiative to promote the objective which the Soviet Union has in view -- for its proposal has an obvious appeal to non-nuclear-weapon States -- any proposal of such large scope must also take into account the need to ensure the participation of the two nuclear-weapon Powers which are not present in this Committee.

90. Turning now to the question of general and complete disarmament, on which General Assembly resolution 2454 B (XXIII) requires us to make renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress, my delegation finds that the Committee has been fully pre-occupied with several important collateral measures of arms control and partial disarmament. At the time the eight non-aligned sponsors members of this Committee introduced that resolution in the First Committee at the twenty-third session of the General Assembly I had this to say:

> "While we appreciate [the] effort by the eight sponsors in response to the general sense of frustration felt by all Member States at the lack of progress on a treaty on general and complete disarmament ..., we wonder whether the crowded and complex agenda of the Eighteen-Nation Disarmament Committee will in fact enable that body to address itself seriously to this matter in 1969 or even in the following year." (A/C.1/PV.1629, provisional, p.32)

We note that the questions that we are discussing are also some of the measures which are envisaged for the first stage of general and complete disarmament. It would be well to examine carefully next year whether a return to the global approach holds promise of more substantial results. At this moment one cannot help but agree with Mrs. Myrdal that --

> "The armaments race will run faster and faster ahead of us, leaving us with a feeling of frustration as our task automatically becomes more and more gigantic." (ENDC/PV.397, para.85)

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91. Before I turn to the next subject, let me say a few words about the environment of the disarmament negotiations. My delegation has been struck by the number of issues to which no viable solutions seem possible without the participation in the negotiations of France and the People's Republic of China. Whether it is the question of a comprehensive test-ban treaty, the cut-off of production of fissionable material, the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons, or the spread of these weapons to non-nuclear-weapon States, the co-operation of the two nuclear-weapon Powers appears to be essential as well as urgent. At the meeting of this Committee on 3 July the representative of Japan asked, "How can we hope for the realization of general and complete disarmament without the participation of all the nuclear Powers?" (ENDC/PV.416, para.60). At our meeting on 7 August Ambassador Eschauzier of the Netherlands expressed the hope that the strategic arms limitation talks would in due course include all the nuclear-weapon Powers (ENDC/PV.426, para.85).

92. It may be asked how we are to secure the co-operation of the People's Republic of China. That major Power will not consider itself bound by any measures of arms control or disarmament to the negotiation and conclusion of which it is not a party. What is more, China will not participate in any negotiations under the auspices or aegis of any of the organs of the United Nations unless its lawful rights are restored in the world organization. This is a situation which deserves the urgent attention of all of us.

93. I shall speak on the other subjects on a subsequent occasion.

94. Mr. ROSHCHIN (Union of Soviet Socialist Republics) (translation from Russian): In connexion with the fact that the membership of our Committee has increased by the addition of new participants, the representatives of six countries — Hungary, Argentina, Morocco, the Netherlands, Pakistan, Yugoslavia — allow me first of all to welcome you, Mr. Chairman, and all our new colleagues in the Committee and to wish you every success in the responsible and honourable task of solving disarmament problems. We express the hope that the participation of the representatives of the aforesaid countries in the work of our Conference will contribute to progress in the work of the Committee in carrying out the important and responsible tasks which are set before it in the field of disarmament. I welcome the participation of

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our new colleagues in the work of the Committee with all the more satisfaction because the countries which they represent have invariably shown great interest in the problems of disarmament and expressed a persistent desire to contribute to the solution of the tasks set before the Committee. By their participation in the Committee the six new States, which play an important role in international affairs, widen the prospects of constructive work by the Committee in solving urgent problems of disarmament.

95. In the agenda (ENDC/236, p.3) of our Committee which was agreed upon and approved on 15 August 1968, an important place is given to the question of further effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at the earliest date and to nuclear disarmament. The particular significance of the aforesaid question is explained by the fact that out of all the weapons existing today nuclear weapons are the most destructive and deadly means of warfare. This particular fact was stressed in the resolutions of the last session of the General Assembly. Many of the representatives who have spoken during the current and the spring sessions of the Committee, including those who have spoken today at the present meeting, have referred to the need to exert greater efforts in order to achieve progress towards the prohibition of nuclear weapons, the cessation of their production and the elimination of all stockpiles.

96. In our statement today we should like to set forth briefly once again the position of the Soviet Union with regard to the major problems of nuclear disarmament. First of all we wish to note that the Committee, in considering partial disarmament measures such as, for instance, demilitarization of the sea-bed, is thus contributing to some extent to the solution of the overall problem — nuclear disarmament as a whole. Through individual measures, however limited they may seem at first sight, it is possible to reduce the size of the springboard on which the defenders of the nuclear arms race and those circles which base their military and political concepts on plans for the use of nuclear weapons, and consequently for the further development and stockpiling of such weapons, continue to hold their positions.

97. A number of very important recent agreements relating to the field of disarmament show convincingly that, given the desire, it is possible to achieve success in the struggle to prevent a further extension of the nuclear arms race. These agreements are well known and can be an encouraging example for us in our work.

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I refer to such agreements as the Antarctic Treaty[3/], the Moscow Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1) on the partial prohibition of nuclear weapons concluded in 1963, the Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) annex) concluded in 1967, and lastly the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (ENDC/226*). These Treaties are important milestones on the road towards our major objective — the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.

98. The position of the Soviet Union in regard to nuclear disarmament, as you are aware, was set forth in the Memorandum of the Government of the USSR of 1 July 1968 on some urgent measures for stopping the arms race and for disarmament (ENDC/227). That Memorandum stated the readiness of the Soviet Union to begin negotiations on the complete cessation of the production of nuclear weapons, the reduction of stockpiles and the subsequent complete prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons under appropriate international control. The Soviet Government proposed to all other nuclear States that such negotiations should begin forthwith in order to bring about the most complete nuclear disarmament.

99. Speaking on 10 July at the session of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, reaffirmed the desire of the Soviet Government to discuss the problem of nuclear disarmament. He stated:

> "All the main problems relating to complete nuclear disarmament and the elimination of nuclear weapons — in other words, to prevention of the use of atomic energy for the production of nuclear weapons -- can be solved in the right way only with the participation of all the nuclear Powers, and I stress the word 'all'. The Soviet Government is ready, as in the past, to discuss this immensely important question with the representatives of other nuclear Powers."

The Soviet Union is prepared already at the present time to agree to partial measures aimed at complete nuclear disarmament and to elaborate and conclude the necessary international agreements in this connexion without delay.

3/ United Nations Treaty Series, vol.402, p.71 et seq.

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100. The achievement of an agreement on prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons would be an important step towards solution of the problem of nuclear disarmament and the complete elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. An agreement on this subject would be an important restraining factor for all those who might purpose to use nuclear weapons. By dispelling the suspicions of certain States in regard to other States in connexion with the question of the possible use of nuclear weapons, such an agreement would contribute to improvement of the international atmosphere, It is to be regretted, however, that the other nuclear Powers have not expressed their desire, as the Soviet Union has done, to outlaw nuclear weapons.

101. One of the top priority places among the partial measures that contribute towards nuclear disarmament is assigned to the question of the cessation of underground nuclear tests. Last year's session of the United Nations General Assembly, in resolution 2455 (XXIII) (ENDC/237), called upon "all nuclear-weapon States to suspend nuclear weapon tests in all environments".

102. The Soviet Union once again set forth its position in regard to that question in the Memorandum of the Soviet Government dated 1 July 1968, to which I have already referred. That Memorandum states:

> "The Soviet Union has been and continues to be a steadfast advocate of the prohibition of all nuclear-weapon tests, believing that the banning of all tests will promote the consolidation of peace and the slackening of the arms race. The Soviet Government is prepared to reach agreement without delay on the banning of underground nuclear-weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection to control observance of the ban." (ENDC/227, p.3)

103. The question of an international exchange of seismic data has been dealt with in last year's General Assembly resolution 2455 (XXIII), to which I have already referred and in the statements and working papers of a number of delegations in our Committee, in particular in the working paper of the Canadian delegation (ENDC/251/Rev.1). We have already set forth our position in regard to this question (ENDC/PV.402, para.72) in connexion with the consideration of the idea put forward by the delegation of Sweden regarding the creation of a so-called "detection club" (ENDC/154). The Soviet side

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remarked that this idea deserved attention if in that way it would be possible to go as far as to conclude a mutually acceptable treaty banning underground tests of nuclear weapons. In this connexion we believe that participation in an international exchange of seismic data should in no way impose upon the participants in such an exchange any obligations in regard to the carrying out of international inspections on their territories, and that the assessment of the collected data should be carried out, not by any supra-national international organ, but by each of the States parties to the treaty. Of course, the supply of seismic data by States should be carried out on a voluntary basis.

104. However, as practice has shown, the idea of an international exchange of seismic data is usually linked by the Western Powers with the creation of some sort of international centre and with the carrying out of on-site inspection. Thus the United Kingdom delegation, in advocating an international exchange of seismic data, expressed itself in favour of the creation of international machinery and linked this exchange of seismic data with its proposal (ENDC/232) for the creation of a committee which would have also the right to carry out inspections (ENDC/PV.404, paras. 12 et seq.).

105. The Soviet Union considers that the development of modern science and technology has reached a level which makes it possible to exercise control through the use of national means over the fulfilment of an agreement banning underground tests. Control would give all States the assurance that the agreement in question was being conscientiously carried out. Of course, if one is anxious to continue underground nuclear tests, one can clutter the way to an agreement with a great number of artificial obstacles, including those of a scientific and technical character, in order to justify one's negative attitude. The history of the many years of negotiations on the cessation of nuclear weapon tests provides us with numerous examples of the way in which those who wanted to delay the solution of the problem of tests have acted at times precisely in this direction. If, on the contrary, States have the firm desire and determination to put an end, once and for all, to dangerous nuclear weapon tests underground, then all the possibilities exist for concluding an appropriate international agreement and for its subsequent implementation.

106. We are convinced that none of the nuclear Powers will venture to violate the agreement banning underground nuclear tests when national means of detection are used for control over the implementation of that agreement. In the conditions

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where dozens of States possess sensitive seismic equipment capable of detecting and identifying nuclear explosions over great distances, there is too great a risk that a violation of the agreement would be discovered. For its part, the Soviet Union is ready without delay to sign an agreement banning nuclear-weapon tests on the basis of the use of national means of detection, and strictly to abide by the agreement.

107. Certain delegations have put forward here in the Committee various proposals for a partial solution of the problem of banning underground nuclear tests which, in short, come to the following: that the more powerful underground nuclear weapons up to a certain threshold should be banned, and that the rest of the underground tests should be banned on the basis of an additional agreement. A proposal of that nature was put forward, in particular, as the members of the Committee are aware, by the delegation of the United Arab Republic (ENDC/144, p.33) which proposed the banning of underground nuclear weapon tests above the threshold of a magnitude of 4.75, with the establishment by the nuclear Powers of a moratorium on underground weapons tests below that threshold. We should like to stress that the Soviet side gives its assent to this proposal of the United Arab Republic in the interests of reaching an agreement as quickly as possible, although we are convinced that all underground nuclear explosions, including explosions with a magnitude below the threshold of 4.75, can be detected with national seismic means.

108. In the opinion of the Soviet delegation the achievement of an agreement on underground tests depends upon a political decision of the Governments of the nuclear Powers. The demand for the solution of the problem of banning underground nuclear tests on the basis of on-site inspection not only does not help towards concluding an agreement in regard to the problem but, on the contrary, blocks its solution.

109. In the course of the negotiations in the Eighteen-Nation Committee a number of delegations, besides those I have previously mentioned, have put forward some other proposals relating to the field of nuclear disarmament. In particular, considerable attention has been devoted to the question of creating denuclearized zones in various parts of the world. In its memorandum dated 1 July 1968 (ENDC/227 p.4) the Soviet Government confirmed that it supported the creation of such zones, basing itself on the premise that such a measure should

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effectively limit the area of deployment of nuclear weapons and fully correspond to the objective of preventing their direct or indirect proliferation.

110. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union, Mr. Gromyko, in his statement to which I have already referred earlier, dwelt particularly on the question of denuclearized zones. He stressed that the Soviet Union continued to believe that the creation of a zone free of nuclear missiles in the area of the Mediterranean would be of enormous significance for the security of Europe, of the African continent and of the Near and Middle East. The non-deployment of nuclear weapons and of the means of their delivery in the Mediterranean area is one of the most important questions which deserves serious consideration by the interested States, and today it is more urgent than ever before.

111. In pursuing its peace-loving foreign policy, the Soviet Union has invariably advocated the all-round strengthening of international security. In that connexion we should like once again to draw attention to the well-known proposals of the Soviet Union and other socialist States on questions of collective security in Europe and in Asia.

112. Besides the consideration and agreeing of a number of partial measures in the field of nuclear disarmament, to which the Committee has devoted considerable attention, there is also the important task of giving effect to the decisions already agreed in this field. This relates above all to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. The supporters of that Treaty can note with satisfaction that so far it has been signed by over ninety States and that eighteen of them have ratified that international agreement. As is known, the Soviet Union has decided to begin the process of ratification of the non-proliferation Treaty.

113. In this connexion we should like to express the hope that most of the countries of the world will treat with the utmost responsibility the important task of consistently implementing the non-proliferation Treaty and will exert every effort to ensure that this agreement, which was elaborated as a result of lengthy and difficult negotiations with due regard to the views and positions of the various States, is put into force without further delay.

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114. The peoples of the world are closely watching the actions of those governments that have not as yet signed the non-proliferation Treaty. The attempts of opponents of the Treaty to gain access to nuclear weapons or to arrange for their production will be met with general and resolute condemnation throughout the world.

115. We express our support for the statements that have been made during the current session of the Committee by the representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, the United Arab Republic, the United Kingdom, Canada, the Netherlands and a number of other States which have spoken in favour of the earliest ratification and entry into force of the non-proliferation Treaty. In this connexion we should like to draw the attention of the Committee to that part of the statement made by the representative of the Polish People's Republic in which he stated:

> "... to be fully effective the Treaty must be signed, ratified and faithfully observed by all countries, and in particular by those with advanced possibilities for producing nuclear weapons." (ENDC/PV.399, para.51)

116. The implementation of the non-proliferation Treaty would be an important contribution to the cause of relaxing international tension and strengthening peaceful relations between States. Its entry into force would give an additional impetus to further disarmament negotiations which the parties to the non-proliferation Treaty undertook under its article VI to pursue in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the arms race, and in the first place the nuclear arms race.

117. In conclusion we should like to stress once again that nuclear disarmament is the most important problem of the present time. In solving individual partial problems in this field, we are paving the way to the elimination of the threat of a nuclear war. Progress in that direction depends on the readiness of States to agree to the implementation of definite measures in the field of disarmament. The task of the Committee is, above all, to prepare and agree upon political solutions of the problems of disarmament and, in the first place, the solution of the problem of eliminating the danger caused by the nuclear arms race.

118. Mr. CZARKOWSKI (Poland): The amount of attention devoted by the Committee to the problem of the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed reflects the importance which many delegations attach to its successful solution. The prominence accorded to the question in our debate stems from the realization that the conclusion of an

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agreement banning all military activity on the sea-bed and the ocean floor would have many beneficial effects. First, a treaty preventing an arms race on the sea-bed would stimulate this Committee's efforts to negotiate the successful conclusion of other partial measures of disarmament, thus bringing closer the prospect of general and complete disarmament. It would bring about the easing of international tension and create an atmosphere of trust and confidence in relations between States. Furthermore, it would greatly facilitate measures aimed at the exploitation of the entire sea environment and its resources exclusively for peaceful purposes, in keeping with General Assembly resolutions 2340 (XXII) and 2467 A (XXIII). Finally, it would play a key role in preventing the arms race from spreading to the vast environment of the sea-bed.

119. As we are all aware, it is easier by far to prevent that arms race from infecting new areas -- or at least to contain it while it is still controllable -- than to try to stamp it out from areas where various weapons systems and military structures have long been established. To prove that point let me mention only the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and the outer space Treaty of 1967 (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI), Annex).

120. The views of the Polish delegation with regard to the three principal issues involved -- that is, the nature of the treaty prohibitions, the limits beyond which the prohibitions should apply, and the question of verification to ensure compliance with those prohibitions -- have already been put on record. We dealt with them in our statement at the Committee's meeting on 22 April (ENDC/PV.406, paras. 11 et seq.).

121. Since that time the consideration of this issue has been further expanded. A draft treaty prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor has been submitted by the United States (ENDC/249). We also had a lively debate in which delegations commented on the draft treaties submitted by the Soviet Union (ENDC/240) and the United States, elucidating many of the difficult and complex aspects of the problem.

122. Against this background my delegation wishes to present its position and the conclusions it has reached at this stage of the consideration of the demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor.

123. The first conclusion which to our mind arises from the debate so far is that a majority of delegations around this table favour the concept of exploitation of the sea-bed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes. Such an approach in keeping with the General Assembly resolutions mentioned earlier corresponds to the desires of the international community anxious to see that no barriers of military installations or structures clutter the vast sea environment. On the contrary, what is

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generally desired is the peaceful co-operation of nations in a joint effort to exploit for the benefit of all the immeasurable natural resources, whether in the form of power, raw materials or foodstuffs. The latter consideration is of singular importance in view of the rate of population growth. I believe that we are called upon to open up the sea environment for peaceful exploitation, not to declare it out of bounds for military reasons.

124. It goes without saying that the full exploration and use of the sea-bed for peaceful purposes is possible only in conditions of a total demilitarization of the environment. We feel that a treaty which proposes to prohibit the emplacement of only nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and the associated launching platforms, but which fails to cover all weapons and military activities, cannot ensure the achievement of that objective. In our debate so far we have heard many statements which eloquently analysed all the weaknesses of a limited ban. Quite apart from the nature and extent of amendments offered by some delegations, it has become evident that a common denominator of most of the views presented in our Committee is the inadequacy of proposals seeking to limit prohibitions to only nuclear and other mass destruction weapons while licensing conventional weapons. It was rightly raised in many statements that such a limited ban would fail to slow down the arms race and would not succeed in safeguarding States from attack with conventional weapons emplaced on the sea-bed and ocean floor.

125. We are not convinced that the question of the arms race boils down to weapons of mass destruction alone. We are also not persuaded that there are not, either now or in a foreseeable future, real possibilities of a conventional arms race on the sea-bed threatening any State. On the contrary, we believe that the present state of the military art and technology fully enables the emplacement on the sea-bed and ocean floor of such conventional offensive weapons as guided sea mines, torpedoes and other types of what are considered to be conventional weapons. The present trend in arms development indicates that the possibilities of emplacement of new weapons on the sea-bed will increase progressively every year. I would go even further and suggest that proliferation of ever more perfect and treaty-exempt conventional weapons emplaced on the sea-bed would ultimately erode the possibility of a complete and effective elimination of weapons of mass destruction from that environment. To exempt conventional weapons from treaty prohibitions would mean making the control-free conventional military installations available to have the banned weapons mounted on them. As a result an uncontrolled and ominous threat would obtain, a threat of development and emplacement on the sea-bed of weapons easily adaptable either to conventional or to

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nuclear war. A similar ambivalence is not altogether impossible in the case of offensive and defensive weapons, where the dividing line may be highly relative. A treaty which would extend its prohibitions to all military activity on the sea-bed would make irrelevant all concern over defensive or offensive weapons and over weapons of double application.

126. In our view, a treaty limited to nuclear and mass destruction weapons would amount to granting States a licence to emplace on the sea-bed a variety of conventional weapons, thus stimulating the arms race rather than containing it. It would also increase the threat of conventional military conflict that, given the present political and strategic realities, could so easily turn into a nuclear one.

127. We fail to see merit in the argument that article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) supports a treaty limited to prohibiting the emplacement of nuclear and mass destruction weapons alone. First of all, the undertaking to pursue negotiations in good faith does not refer to nuclear weapons alone; and, second, one cannot resort to an interpretation of the already-existing disarmament agreement to justify a limitation of the scope of another agreement.

128. My delegation shares the views of those representatives who refuse to accept an argument that full demilitarization of the sea-bed is not feasible because of alleged impracticability of control of compliance and because security requirements make it necessary to implant on the sea-bed defensive conventional weapons. We are strongly convinced that the prohibition of all military activity on the sea-bed and ocean floor would not complicate control procedures. In this regard we agree with the representative of Mexico, who at our meeting on 7 August declared:

> "On the contrary, it would seem rather that the prohibition of all military installations or activities would facilitate the tasks of control, since there would be no need to draw difficult distinctions between the different types of military installations." (ENDC/PV.426, para.42)

I am sure that this view is also shared by many other delegations. On the strength of this my delegation is fully convinced that there are realistic possibilities of concluding an agreement on a complete demilitarization of the sea-bed and ocean floor. We are in full agreement with the representative of Mexico when at that meeting he eloquently argued that the most propitious moment for a complete agreement is now, not in the future (ibid., para.51).

129. My delegation believes that a proposal for the complete demilitarization of the sea-bed beyond the twelve-mile zone of territorial waters is reasonable and realistic. Such a zone would not deprive States of the possibility of defending their own coasts. This

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concept does not preclude the right of installation by States of a variety of defence arrangements, including submarine detection devices, in the twelve-mile coastal zone. The proposal to ban all military activities outside the twelve-mile zone of territorial waters creates equal conditions for and imposes equal obligations upon all parties. It is not without significance also that the twelve-mile exempt zone would be acceptable to an overwhelming majority of States which have territorial waters extending more than three miles. For that matter, we do not see what legal complications a twelve-mile treaty-exempted zone would involve for the States recognizing territorial waters of only three miles or less than twelve miles. On the other hand, it is evident that it would certainly make it difficult for States having territorial waters of twelve miles, or less than twelve miles but more than three miles, to accept a three-mile zone.

130. Finally, we consider that the desire to extend the treaty-exempted zone indicated by references to the right of States to the continental shelf would create additional difficulties in the implementation of the prohibition under the treaty. If the continental shelf were not covered by the treaty prohibitions this would not only make its provisions more complicated but, what is even more important, would leave outside the scope of the treaty an area in which the installation of weapons is potentially most probable.

131. For all these reasons we believe strongly that the conclusion of a treaty prohibiting the use for military purposes of the sea-bed and the ocean floor, as proposed in the draft tabled by the delegation of the USSR in March, would constitute the most effective solution of the problem in question.

132. The CHAIRMAN (Yugoslavia): With the Committee's permission I shall now make a statement in my capacity as representative of Yugoslavia.

133. I should like first of all to thank sincerely the representatives of Canada, India, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan and the USSR for their kind words of welcome extended to me personally. I want to thank also all the heads of delegations who have addressed a welcome and good wishes to Yugoslavia on the occasion of its inclusion in the membership of this Committee. I have understood those expressions of friendship and solidarity to be a recognition of the policy of Yugoslavia and of the efforts which my country has been making in the field of disarmament as well as in promoting international relations. It is my privilege and pleasure to be here today and to take part personally in the deliberations on the very important matters which are on the agenda of this Committee. Allow me to assure members that the Yugoslav delegation will spare no effort to contribute to the noble work of this Committee.

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134. The Yugoslav delegation wishes to reiterate the Yugoslav Government's appreciation of the opportunity to take part in the Committee's work as a member of this body, together with other members and in co-operation with all factors interested in solving successfully and efficiently the problems of disarmament and security in the world. When it becomes acquainted in more detail with the comprehensive documentation of the Committee and the proposals submitted to it, the delegation of Yugoslavia will be in a position, we hope, to advance further views and observations.

135. It is my pleasure to have the privilege to present, on behalf of the Government of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in this introductory statement the Yugoslav position on certain specific problems and aspects of disarmament.

136. I should like to say at the beginning that Yugoslavia has followed with great interest the Committee's deliberations during the past several years, rejoicing in every step forward it has made. We welcome the decision to expand the membership of the Committee by eight new member States, Yugoslavia having the honour to be one of them.

137. Yugoslavia takes a deep interest in promoting lasting peace and international co-operation in the world on the basis of the principles of the United Nations Charter. We are confident that general and complete disarmament under effective international control constitutes one of the fundamental components and prerequisites of a stable peace, genuine security in the world and the prosperity of mankind. We are sure that this is also the view of all peace-loving countries. But by accepting general and complete disarmament as the main objective and the sole way of securing a durable peace and security for all, we have recognized also the fact that in practice we have to begin by the adoption of some partial, initial measures. Therefore Yugoslavia, together with numerous other countries, has been making constant efforts in this direction, especially within the United Nations General Assembly and the United Nations framework.

138. This is not an appropriate time for me to make a general review of the results obtained so far in this field. We admit that we are not satisfied with the progress in the disarmament negotiations. However, we recognize that the efforts made in the past have not been without any results. Such measures as the partial test-ban

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Treaty (ENDC/100/Rev.1), the outer space Treaty (General Assembly resolution 2222 (XXI) (annex), the Antarctic Treaty, the non-proliferation Treaty (ENDC/226*) and some others represent the results of these efforts. Although these agreements represent in the main armament-preventive measures, they nevertheless have a positive effect on disarmament negotiations.

139. Unfortunately, parallel to these activities an intensive arms race is running ahead of us with negative effects on disarmament negotiations and on world peace and security. This has brought about a situation in which the striking power of nuclear weapons, and conventional weapons as well, has reached such a degree that the whole of mankind might be destroyed several times over, whereas the question of substantial disarmament under effective international control is somehow in an impasse.

140. Concerning the continuous arms race, let me mention only a few very disquieting examples which we have witnessed. Military expenditure continues to increase steadily; all of us are witnessing growing pressure in the so-called military industrial complex for further extension and intensification of the production of the most sophisticated, the most destructive and the most expensive arms the world has ever known. The insistence on developing and initiating the installation of antiballistic missiles, the continuance of testing and deployment of multiple independent re-entry vehicles and other delivery systems, the spreading of the idea of hiding nuclear weapons under the sea or on the sea-bed because of the false assumption that they are no longer secure on the continental soil are horrifying examples indicating the possible further developments unless the tendencies and practices I have mentioned are blocked in time. Enormous danger also comes from conventional armaments. Their use in so-called local wars has daily been causing very serious losses of human lives and material destruction at a time when mankind is supposed to be living in peace.

141. The causes of the slow progress and meagre results of disarmament negotiations are no doubt diverse and complex. I do not want to take up the Committee's time in analysing them, as they are generally known. Nevertheless, so far they have not been eliminated, owing above all, in our view, to the lack of will of some Powers having the most decisive say in arms limitation and disarmament, as well as owing to the fact that the policy "from positions of force" still prevails in international relations in the present day world, permanently regenerating -- among other things -- the armaments race.

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142. Despite such a state of affairs it is the view of my delegation that today more substantial progress in the field of disarmament should be possible. These expectations of ours are based first of all on the fact that recently we have been living in a climate of negotiations rather than that of confrontation, which was the main feature of the cold-war period. Resistance to the policy of "from positions of force" and the efforts to outlaw the use of force in any form in the relations among States are growing. There are more and more signs that the contemporary world is no longer ready to live in a condition of permanent threat and fear of destruction.

143. On the other hand, it seems that even the Powers which have reached the highest level of nuclear and other armaments have realized that their own national security cannot be insured by further stockpiling of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. This attitude has been reflected inter alia, in the announced readiness of the United States and the USSR to enter into bilateral strategic arms limitation talks. My delegation wishes to join other countries in emphasizing the importance of an early beginning of negotiations on a limitation of strategic missile systems, both offensive and defensive. We realize that important negotiations like these have to be well prepared. However, knowing how much the results of SALT may depend on an early initiation, I want to stress the danger of prolonged waiting for "all favourable conditions", since this may produce an adverse effect and loss of present opportunity.

144. That is why we believe that other governments too should be called upon to bear their part of responsibilities in disarmament negotiations. All governments are justly expected to contribute effectively to the solution of a problem as universal as disarmament is. We should like, therefore, to repeat our hope that France, whose place in the Committee was secured from 1962, will find it possible to take its place in these negotiations. At the same time we would like to stress the urgency of creating conditions which would allow the participation of the People's Republic of China in disarmament negotiations.

145. In this connexion let me mention also the role of the machinery dealing with disarmament. I have in mind, first of all, the need for the intensification of the work of this Committee and for using all the possibilities at its disposal, along the lines already suggested here by several delegations. Parallel with this, a better use of the United Nations General Assembly and its bodies created for this purpose should be assured, including the convening at the appropriate time of special conferences on disarmament as and when they are needed.

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146. Yugoslavia, like many other countries, has always taken an active part in the efforts aimed at starting real processes in the field of disarmament. I shall limit myself to mentioning only some of them. In May 1965 Yugoslavia submitted to the United Nations Disarmament Commission a memorandum on necessary immediate measures in the field of disarmament, such as an undertaking not to use nuclear weapons; the banning of all nuclear tests; and the prevention of further proliferation of nuclear weapons in any form whatsoever, coupled with the acceptance of an agreement to start denuclearization of the nuclear-weapon Powers themselves (DC/216).

147. Motivated by the desire to achieve meaningful results in the field of disarmament and to strengthen the security of all nations, Yugoslavia and other non-aligned countries initiated a request to the United Nations General Assembly to convene a world disarmament conference. We believe this request to be still valid. Finally, the Yugoslav Government made known its position on the non-proliferation Treaty in a statement of 11 April 1968, which was further elaborated through the activity of Yugoslavia during the United Nations General Assembly session and at the Conference of Non-Nuclear-Weapon States in Geneva in August 1968.

148. According to our basic position, which has been largely shared by other governments too, this Treaty has constituted only the first step towards the positive solution of a complex of concrete questions, especially in the following three main fields: nuclear disarmament, international security, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. We share the view of those delegations that expressed the expectation that early entry into force of the Treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons would, in view of its article VI, in turn stimulate progress in the negotiation of effective measures relating to a cessation of the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

149. We believe that the fate of the Treaty itself -- that is, its durability, the number of acceding countries and its effective implementation -- will greatly depend on progress in the above-mentioned fields. The key to this, of course, is primarily in the hands of the nuclear-weapon States, but all of us have to share the responsibility.

150. Turning now to concrete questions on the agenda of the Committee, allow me at this late stage to refer only to some issues we deem urgent and pressing, and on which a solution should be found soon.

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151. There is first of all the question of banning all tests of nuclear weapons. We believe that there are no justified reasons for further delay in solving this problem. The existing partial nuclear test-ban Treaty ought to be completed now. The proposal by the Swedish delegation, in our opinion, provides a sound basis for a solution and therefore deserves our full attention. We consider that underground tests should be suspended immediately -- that is, even before a treaty in this respect has been concluded. We also feel that all States should halt all tests of nuclear weapons. Tolerating further tests, in our view, means tolerating and practically encouraging the arms race -- especially the terrifying nuclear arms race.

152. We possess some very valuable studies of specialized scientific institutions on this matter. That knowledge and a realistic approach have been reflected in many sound suggestions of a technical nature made by several delegations in this Committee. We sincerely believe, therefore, that detection and identification problems could be solved provided all the nuclear Powers showed a larger degree of political readiness to put an end to all nuclear tests for military purposes.

153. In the opinion of the Yugoslav delegation the ban on the use of nuclear weapons constitutes another urgent measure which should be adopted without delay. In that connexion my delegation wishes to recall the documents of the United Nations General Assembly on this subject, and especially resolution 2289 (XXII) (ENDC/210) of 1967, expressing the conviction that urgent consideration of the conclusion of a convention on the banning of the use of nuclear weapons is necessary.

154. In that connexion the possibility of adopting a more limited step forward towards the renunciation of the use of nuclear weapons before the convention has been concluded has been pointed out. We are of the opinion that other possibilities should also be considered in order to find, as early as possible, a solution which would be acceptable to the largest number of countries. We are confident that this important question will receive full attention in the Committee's further deliberations.

155. In mentioning those two problems in the first instance my delegation has no intention of indicating an order of priorities or a time-table. We agree that there is a link between different measures in the field of disarmament and we believe that the adoption of a minimum of a certain number of related measures would be in the general interest and would promote our deliberations.

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156. The creation of atom-free zones and zones of limited armament constitutes, in the opinion of my delegation, one of the initial measures which might be acceptable to the largest number of countries. In the Treaty on the denuclearization of Latin America (ENDC/186) we have a good example of the applicability of this idea. That initiative of Latin-American countries may serve as an encouragement to the other regions of the world. The Yugoslav delegation would wish that such an idea might be applied also in Europe and in the Mediterranean area. That continent and region urgently need such steps, since they have been over-burdened with stockpiles of nuclear weapons, a part of which alone could destroy the majority of European industrial centres in a few minutes.

157. Europe is a continent with the deepest division between blocs, with an enormous concentration of military potential, and with impressive foreign armed forces. That has created a situation in which the continent has been constantly lacking true security, even in peace-time circumstances and in conditions of a relative lessening of international tensions. It is natural, therefore, that the problem of European security should have been the object of permanent concern to all Europeans -- and not to them alone -- and that recently it should again have become the subject of intensified consultations. Yugoslavia has been actively co-operating in efforts aimed at developing in Europe processes contributing effectively to promoting the conditions of true, friendly co-operation among all European States, on the basis of equality, independence, national sovereignty and mutual respect.

158. In connexion with the problem of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons, my delegation has been studying with great attention and appreciation both the report by the Secretary-General and the group of experts (A/7575) and the existing proposals, suggestions and positions put forward during the deliberations in this Committee. It is the belief of my delegation that the report of the Secretary-General, and particularly the conclusions and recommendations contained in it, sound an extremely urgent warning to proceed as soon as possible to the complete banning of those weapons and the destruction of stockpiles of them. Therefore Yugoslavia will support all efforts directed towards the complete banning of the use of weapons of that kind and to the destruction of all stockpiles and the prohibition of any further manufacture of those armaments.

159. The problem of preventing an arms race on the sea-bed has held a prominent place in the Committee's deliberations this year. Yugoslavia, as a maritime country, is interested in its solution. However, we continue to hold the view that more urgent

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problems before the Committee should not be overshadowed by that issue. Allow me to add that my delegation is not in a position at this stage to present more detailed comments on those two issues, since there has been no time for the various agencies in Yugoslavia to study all the new proposals that have been submitted recently in this Committee, both on chemical and bacteriological weapons and on the prevention of an arms race on the sea-bed. We are confident, however, that we shall be able to submit our further considerations soon, encouraged by the intensity of the deliberations of the Committee on those items and inspired by the meaningful suggestions and recommendations submitted by several delegations here.

160. This Committee has not been in a position this year again to devote due attention to the problems of general and complete disarmament, in spite of the fact that the United Nations General Assembly at its twenty-third session adopted a special resolution on this matter, resolution 2454 B (XXIII), requesting the Eighteen-Nations Committee on Disarmament "to make renewed efforts towards achieving substantial progress in reaching an agreement on the question of general and complete disarmament under effective international control", and to "continue its urgent efforts to negotiate collateral measures of disarmament" (ENDC/237). The reasons for such a state of affairs are obvious and need no repeating. I do wish, however, to reaffirm the belief of the Yugoslav Government that we should be strong and courageous enough not to allow that programme to be drowned in a sea of other issues.

161. We believe that questions of disarmament cannot be dealt with separately, in isolation, outside the context of existing international relations. The process of disarmament can be successfully developed solely in a favourable international atmosphere. One of the most important pre-conditions for the creation of such an atmosphere is the renunciation of the use of force in international relations, respect for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of any country, and non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. Genuine security for all in the world may be created only through a system of collective security in which every nation and every country will have the opportunity to play an active role on the basis of friendly co-operation and fulfilment of mutual obligations among countries, regardless of the differences in their political and social systems. Yugoslavia has always been

(The Chairman, Yugoslavia)

ready to co-operate actively in all efforts aimed at starting these processes, regardless of which region of the world is concerned, as we are convinced that world peace and security are indivisible and that any progress in this direction in one part of the world encourages similar undertakings in other parts of the world.

The Conference decided to issue the following communiqué:

"The Conference of the Eighteen-Nation Committee on Disarmament today held its 429th plenary meeting in the Palais des Nations, Geneva, under the chairmanship of Mr. Anton Vratusa, representative of Yugoslavia.

"Statements were made by the representatives of Canada, India, Czechoslovakia, Pakistan, the USSR, Poland and Yugoslavia.

"The delegation of Canada submitted a revised working paper on Requests to Governments for Information about Exchange of Seismological Data (ENDC/251/Rev.1).

"The next meeting of the Conference will be held on Thursday, 21 August 1969, at 10.30 a.m.".

The meeting rose at 1.25 p.m.